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The purpose of this thesis is to examine what role, if any, the United
States can play in encouraging democratic transitions. It is a comparison of
some of the different approaches the United States used in its relations with
three countries in which it had varying amounts of influence: Chile (some
influence), Brazil (relatively little influence), and El Salvador (relatively
major influence). The two most fundamental questions it asks are: What would
be the best policy for the United States to follow should it decide to
encourage a democratic transition in any given country? And assuming a
coherent approach, how much of an impact are United States' efforts likely to
have? In reference to the first question, this study finds that a bipartisan
foreign policy, prudently using the various instruments at its disposal, is
the best course for the United States to follow. As for the second question,
the United States can have an impact on democratic transitions, but that
impact is likely to be quite limited in comparison to the influence of other
factors (historical, cultural, social, economic, and political) within that
country. As such, increased involvement does not necessarily increase the
ability of the United States to encourage a democratic transition. It is, in
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The various goals of United States' foreign policy in regards to Latin
America should be understood in their most fundamental form. A primary aim
has been oriented towards maintaining stability in the region. Since the
1970s there has been a greater emphasis on human rights. Others have argued
that it is a combination of protecting American security, political and
economic interests in the area. Promoting stability, supporting human
rights, and protecting American interests in Latin America are not, however,
mutually exclusive goals.
For a viable, long term stability to be maintained, basic human rights
must be respected. If large segments of the population are denied those
rights, resistance will grow. To maintain stability in the face of this
growing resistance, coercion will also have to be increased. Thus, the
stability is founded, not on loyalty to the system, but on the use of force.
. Lars Schoultz, National Security and United States
Policy toward Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1987 ) , p. 34.
. Pressure to adopt a foreign policy based on human rights
began in Congress in the mid-1970s, and was later strongly
endorsed by President Jimmy Carter. See, US, Congress, House,
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights and US Foreign Policy ,
96th Cong., 1st sess., 1979, pp. 220, 221, and 343.
3
. Harold Molineu, US Policy toward Latin America: From
Regionalism to Globalism (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), pp. 9-
12.
Such stability is a fragile stability. It is strong on the surface, but weak
underneath. Without force, it will quickly crumble. Therefore, the respect
for human rights is in the best interests of long term stability.
American security, political and economic interests, likewise, benefit
from regional stability. Without stability, long term security planning
becomes increasingly problematic. In addition, policy becomes more confused,
and economic investment assumes greater risk. Therefore, in the long term the
various goals of United States' foreign policy are actually complementary. As
such, there exists one necessary condition under which all of these long term
aspirations of United States' foreign policy can be met: Good government in
those respective Latin American countries.
In Federalist 51 James Madison wrote, "in framing a government, which is
to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: You
must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next
place, oblige it to control itself." Good government is that government which
is able to meet both of these conditions. If either condition is not met,
then it is not good government. A government which is unable to control the
governed leads to instability. A government which is unable to control itself
becomes repressive and corrupt. Neither siutation is acceptable.
Madison argued further that "a dependence on the people is, no doubt, the
primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the
necessity of auxiliary precautions." Clearly, this is a government within a
specific framework. While "auxiliary precautions" refer to a separation of
powers as suggested by Montesquieu, the hallmark, again, is "a dependence on
the people." It is, in other words, a democracy. Therefore, good government
implies some form of democratic government.
For the purpose of this study, the term democracy will be used along the
lines of Robert Dahl's classic study. It is defined as "a political system
one of the characteristics of which is the quality of being completely or
almost completely responsive to all its citizens." The necessary (but not
necessarily sufficient) conditions for a democracy are that it allow its
citizens the right to formulate their preferences, to indicate those
preferences to fellow citizens and their government by individual and
collective action, and to have their preferences weighed equally (i.e. without
discrimination against the content or source of those preferences) in the
conduct of government.
Democratic government in Latin America is in the best long term interests
of the United States. This is not to say that the United States has always
supported democracy in Latin America. Often, short term concerns have
eclipsed long term interests. American history is replete with examples.
During the Cold War, policy ranged from support for authoritarian regimes to
benign neglect. Such short sightedness should not, however, detract from the
long term benefits of the support for democracy. It helps maintain stability,
without which US security, political and economic interests cannot be
protected. It also tends to respect human rights. One might even say that
the dilemma posed by Robert Osgood between idealism and realism has its
solution within this context. Support for democracy helps achieve the
4
. Robert Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition




. Robert E. Osgood, Ideals and Self-interest in America's
Foreign Relations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953).
various goals of United States' foreign policy while staying true to American
ideals. It is, then, a fundamental assumption of this thesis that the United
States can best achieve its foreign policy goals in the region by promoting
democratic government in those countries. If the United States can best
promote its foreign policy aims by assisting the development of good
government, and hence democracy, it would be useful to examine how such a
policy could be implemented.
Current literature does not adequately address the role international
actors can play in influencing a transition to democracy in developing
countries. Most scholars agree that of the major factors which help explain
democratic government (historical, cultural, social, economic, political, and
international), external factors are the least significant. Thomas Bruneau
and Philippe Faucher are even more explicit: The theme of foreign involvement
in support of democracy is ambiguous and one cannot conclude on the basis of
existing documentation that it is an important factor in the initiation of a
transition. For this reason, the extent of this project is rather limited.
It does not seek to explain democratic development. Instead, it focuses on
the impact the United States government, one of the principal international
actors, can have on that process.
For the purpose of this study, it is important to understand that
democratic development is indeed seen as a process. For instance, Adam
Larry Diamond and Juan Linz, "Introduction: Politics,
Society, and Democracy in Latin America", Democracy in Developing
Countries: Latin America , ed. Diamond, Linz and Lipset (Boulder:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), pp. xiii, 47.
8
. Thomas Bruneau and Philippe Faucher, "Back to Politics:
Democratic Transitions in Retrospect", Working Paper (1987).
Przeworski notes that democratic transitions are a process that consist of
strategic situations, or "conjunctures". They include liberalization, the
establishment of democratic institutions, the development of representative
relations among institutions and between the government and civil society, the
institutionalization of economic conflicts (the ability of individuals to have
their concerns addressed by institutions within government or between
government and civil society) , and the imposition of civilian control over the
q
military. Rather than concentrating on the final product, i.e. democracy,
this study examines the impact the United States can have on that process.
In order to better clarify the process above, it may be useful to provide
some definitions. To borrow from O'Donnell and Schmitter, a transition is
"the interval between one political regime and another." A regime does not
refer to the government itself, but to government and the means of
representation. It is, in other words, the link between society and those who
rule. In this sense, each of the case studies which follow examines a
transition from a military regime towards one that uses democratic means of
representation
.
Przeworski 's stages of democratic transition can be perhaps simplified
into three categories: liberalization, democratization, and consolidation.
The first stage, liberalization, is "the process of making effective certain
. Adam Przeworski, "How Do Transitions to Democracy Get
Stuck and Where?", University of Chicago, September 1988. A
paper presented at the Conference on Internationalization of
Political Democracy, Universite de Montreal, September 28 to
October 2, 1988.
10
. Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter,
Transitions from Authoritarian Rule; Tentative Conclusions about
Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1986 ) , p. 6
.
rights that protect both individuals and social groups from arbitrary or
illegal acts committed by the state or third parties." The respect for
human rights is the most fundamental aspect of this stage. The second stage
links the population with the government. It encompasses the establishment of
democratic institutions, and the development of representative relations. It
also establishes rules for institutionalizing economic conflicts, and imposing
civilian control over the military. Democratization refers to
the processes whereby the rules and procedures of citizenship are
either applied to political institutions previously governed by other
principles, or expanded to include persons not previously enjoying
such rights and obligations, or extended to cover issues and
institutions not previously subject to citizen participation.
The final stage, consolidation, sees the successful completion of that
process. In this stage, the participants choose to play by the rules which
have been established. As Przeworski concludes, a transition to democracy is
completed when partisan alternation in office becomes a real possibility, when
reversible policy changes can result from alternation in office, and when
civilians have established effective control over the military:
To put it more abstractly, democracy is consolidated when uncertainty
is institutionalized: nobody can control the outcomes of the
political process ex post, the results are not predetermined ex ante
and they matter within some predictable limits.
A democratic transition in Latin America can therefore be viewed as a process
that includes the liberalization of a military regime, the ensuing
democratization, and the resulting consolidation of democracy.





. ibid., p. 8.
. Przeworski, op. cit. , p. 3
States can play in influencing the transition to democracy in lesser developed
countries. It is a comparative study of some of the different approaches the
United States could and did use in attempting to encourage that process in
three countries in which it had some influence (Chile), relatively little
influence (Brazil), and significant influence (El Salvador).
The comparative analysis of these three countries is no easy matter. The
disparity between them makes comparisons difficult. It would have simplified
the task to have chosen countries that were more similar in nature.
Concentrating on countries within a particular region, such as Central
America, the Caribbean, the Andean countries, or the Southern Cone may have
permitted a more conclusive study. Yet, as soon became apparent, the greatest
problem in this research was not as much related to regional specificity as it
was in determining the precise impact any particular US administration's
policy had on any given democratic transition. The large number of variables
made precise cause and effect relationships almost impossible to measure. As
such, what would have been gained in detail was outweighed by what would have
been lost in comparison, since only observations of a general nature were of
value. Therefore, the choice of countries in which the United States had
varying amounts of influence provided a better opportunity for a more
comprehensive policy analysis.
Chile was chosen as the country representing the middle level of
influence because of a combination of factors: its relative size and
population, its distance from the United States, past US involvement in its
affairs, and recent interest in seeing a transition. Other countries, such as
Argentina, would also have been interesting cases. However, Chile offered one
thing that few others did. The continuity of the Pinochet regime reduced the
number of variables during the transition, thereby offering a tremendous
advantage
.
Brazil was a more obvious choice. It was selected as a case study with
which the United States has relatively little influence because of its
overwhelming size, both in terms of land and population, and because of its
tremendous importance to both the region and in terms of its relationship with
the United States. In other words, the relative lack of influence did not
equate to an ambivalence as to the fate of that country.
El Salvador was a more difficult choice. It is still far from
consolidating a democratic transition, it is a highly sensitive political
issue, and its civil war added an important and complicated variable. Yet, no
other country appeared as a more attractive alternative. Nicaragua would have
been fascinating, but then one runs into the problem of whether the United
States was trying to encourage a transition, or whether it was attempting to
overthrow a government with which it did not agree. As for the other
countries in the region, none received the level of financial assistance, or
persistent attention, as did the government and situation in El Salvador.
All of the countries selected were under one form of military regime or
another during all or at least part of the Carter (1977-1981) and Reagan
administrations (1981-1989). Unfortunately, they were also at different
stages in the transition process. For this reason, and because the case
studies were so very different, United States' foreign policy was divided in
terms of the approaches for each individual country, and not in terms of the
effect that any single approach had on all the countries. To compensate for
these anomalies a few basic measures were taken.
Due to its basic continuity and middle position, Chile provided the
"classic" example. Many of the policies that would have some bearing in all
cases were developed in this section because they apply especially well to
this case study: Carter's human rights policy, Reagan's realism, and the
compromise between the two. To avoid repetition, some of the analysis from
those two periods was not extended to the chapters on Brazil and El Salvador.
However, the reader should keep these policies in mind throughout the study.
The lack of evidence of United States' influence on the transition in
Brazil, and the fact that a transition was already underway before Carter's
policies could be applied, presented another hurdle. As such, this chapter
emphasized US-Brazil relations in general. For example, the nuclear
proliferations issue examines what might have happened had Carter's human
rights policy been applied before Brazil's "abertura" (political opening) got
under way.
The chapter on El Salvador was also challenging. The civil war itself
presented the greatest obstacle. As such, background information on that
country is provided to a greater extent than in the other two case studies,
since that conflict had a considerable impact on United States' foreign
policy. In addition, since the civil war continues, the issue of
consolidation is difficult to address. As in the other chapters, the results
of administration policies were difficult to measure. Therefore, much
attention was given to the policies themselves. Success was measured as much
in terms of an administration's ability to gain support for those policies as
it was by the impact of those policies. Due to the sensitive political nature
of such policies, and especially as they concern El Salvador, the reader
should keep in mind that the success or failure of certain administration
policies was sometimes viewed in terms of the ability to finance those
policies. This is particularly true of analysis concerning the Reagan
administration. As such, it is not necessarily an endorsement of the policy
itself.
In addition to the above case studies, another issue had to be addressed.
Changes in the world, especially with regards to the Soviet Union, are bound
to have important repercussions on United States' policy towards Latin
America. The situation with Salvador Allende in Chile would, no doubt, have
been handled far differently were it to have occured today instead of 1973.
While Soviet policy affected US relations with all three countires in varying
ways, it proved most expedient to examine the effect on those relations as a
whole by dealing with the issue in a separate chapter. Preceding the three
case studies, therefore, is an examination of what impact the changes in the
international system will have on US foreign policy in the region. Since
those changes apply most directly to Central America and the Caribbean, the
chapter concentrates on those areas. The changes, however, will have
implications on US policy elsewhere in the region.
Also of importance is the research method for this project. This study
attempts to combine historical analysis with political science. As Professor
Edward Laurance suggests, it is the combination of these two disciplines that
is likely to yield the greatest results. Without the empirical contribution
of historical analysis, political science often becomes nothing more than
misguided theories. On the other hand, history in and of itself does not
offer the advantages of a systemic approach that could be useful in the
analysis and/or prediction of the impact that important individuals, ideas, or
events can have. Therefore, a combination of the two methods of examination
appeared to be the best approach to use.
10
The general thesis of this study is that international actors, in this
case the United States, can indeed have an impact on democratic transitions,
even though it may be to a much lesser degree than one might wish. Yet, even
if the impact is not great, it still merits study. This research, therefore,
is not concerned with whether a democratic transition was the ultimate
intention of any particular administration. Instead, it addresses the issue
from the standpoint that were a democratic transition in a developing country
to be a priority for United States' foreign policy, then what would be the
best course to follow? Specifically, it asks: What has the United States
done to influence democratic transitions in the past? Does greater US
influence generated by economic and political clout have a significant impact
on that process? Should the approach vary with the degree of influence? And
assuming a coherent policy, to what extent can the United States influence a
democratic transition in another country? This, in essence, is the subject of
this research.
11
I I . CHANGES IN THE INTERNATION AL SYSTEM
"I am aweary of this moon: would he would change!"
William Shakespeare
A Midsummer-night's Dream
Fundamental changes within the Soviet Union and in its foreign policy
have had profound effects throughout the world. One area in which those
changes are beginning to be felt is in Latin America, especially as it regards
the Caribbean and Central America. Although the precise effects on that area
will not be known for some time, any such changes are bound to have
repercussions for United States' security interests in that area. This
chapter analyzes the changes in Soviet policy towards that area, and the
effects those changes may have on US security interests in the region.
Soviet influence in the Caribbean and Central America has been a concern
to US officials since the days of the Eisenhower administration. With the
aftermath of World War II, United States authority in the region was
unquestioned. In addition, Soviet policies tended to be counterproductive.
During Stalin's reign the rigidity of his policies and the intransigence of
local Communist parties made collaboration with Latin American states nearly
impossible. After his death in 1953, however, the Soviet Union began to
establish diplomatic, commercial, and cultural ties.
. G. Pope Atkins, Latin America in the International
Political System . 2nd ed. (Westview Press: Boulder, 1989), pp
97-103.
12
power in January 1959 the Soviet Union was able to take advantage of the
situation. Having drawn its conclusions from the US-sponsored overthrow of
the reformist Arbenz regime in Guatemala in June 1954, the Cuban government
decided to turn to the Soviet Union for protection against possible US
1intervention. Thus began a Soviet-Cuban relationship that has significantly
influenced events in the region.
Khrushchev's policies of supporting revolutionary movements as a way of
undermining US influence were continued under Leonid Brezhnev, although
without the "pyrotechnics" (i.e., in a more prudent and patient manner)."
Instead of challenging the United States directly, as it had in the Cuban
missile crisis, it began to use Cuba as a surrogate. In the 1960s and 1970s
Cuban advisers were sent to Ghana, Congo-Brazzaville, Guinea-Bissau, Tanzania,
Sierre Leone, Somalia, South Yemen, and Iraq. In addition, Cuba assisted
Algeria in its war against Morocco, and it sent thousands of troops to both
Angola and Ethiopia. Yet, of even more concern to the United States was
Cuban support for revolutionary movements in Latin America, and the connection
the US government drew to the Soviet Union.
In the 1960s Cuba lent direct assistance to revolutionary forces within
such countries as Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, Guatemala, and
Nicaragua. The fact that the Soviet Union had counseled caution to the Cubans
in those early years, and that Cuban relations with the Soviet Union were
. Richard Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala . 4th printing
(University of Texas Press, Austin, 1988), p. 196.
3




. Harold Molineu, US Policy Toward Latin America (Westview
Press: Boulder, 1986), pp. 160-161.
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often strained during that period were irrelevant. The Soviets were still
providing aid to the Cubans, Soviet advisers were present on the island, and
the United States acted as though Communist states were a monolithic bloc.
This view appeared to confirm itself in 1968 when Castro defended the Soviet-
led invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia.
Thus, it was not the Cuban revolution alone that concerned Washington,
but the importance of that area in terms of the overall East-West conflict.
In response, the United States greatly increased its involvement in the area.
No longer the "Good Neighbor" (ended with Guatemala in 1954), the United
States was once again big brother to the area. It not only supported
development through the Alliance for Progress, it also used the OAS to cover
its intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965.
While the era of detente allowed the United States a certain reprieve
from direct involvement in the area, any hopes for accomodation were all but
ended with the fall of Anastasio Somoza in July 1979. Within weeks of the
fall of Somoza, the Sandinistas and Cubans began to establish training camps
and an arms supply network for the Salvadoran guerrillas. In addition, Cuban
William Ratliff, Castroism and Communism in Latin
America. 1959-1976 (AEI-Hoover Policy Study 19, November 1976),
pp. 43-44. Ratliff notes that increasing Cuban dependence on the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe prevented a break in relations,
despite the Soviet "betrayal" of the Cuban government during the
missile crisis.
6
. ibid., p. 45. A more flexible Cuban line emerged in
1968 because Castro needed to devote more time and resources to
his faltering economy (which made Soviet economic and military
aid vital) and because he recognized the repeated failures of the
castroite line throughout Latin America (epitomized by the death
of Guevara). See p. 34.
"Cuban and Nicaraguan Support for the Salvadoran
Insurgency", Department of State Bulletin . May 1982, p. 72.
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advisers, with Soviet backing, assisted the governments of Guyana, Jamaica,
Grenada, and, of course, Nicaragua. For the Reagan administration the
implications were clear: The Soviets were behind the growing level of
violence and a line had to be drawn.
Viewing the instability in Central America and the Caribbean as a result
of the geostrategic situation led once more to heavy US involvement in the
region. Instead of the Alliance for Progress, there was the Caribbean Basin
Initiative (CBI). US backing for an anti-communist regime in El Salvador
remained extensive, despite human rights violations. Pressure on the
Sandinistas was applied by supporting the Contras, and frequent US maneuvers
were held in neighboring Honduras. In 1983 the US invaded the island of
Grenada, finding around 100 Cuban "combatants" and 30 Soviet advisers. It
was a tense period in the Cold War. The costs of these policies to the United
States have been high, not only in terms of dollars, but in the divisiveness
it caused among the American people, including the Iran-Contra affair that
virtually crippled the administration.
Yet, the costs to the Soviet Union have also been high. In addition to
poor relations with the West, Soviet policy in regards to the developing world
had other drawbacks. First, the financial costs of commitment were high and
continued to escalate. Second, support for revolution resulted in less than
desirable relations with other influential states, including Mexico, Brazil,
and Argentina. Third, once support for a movement or government was
initiated, it became difficult to withdraw or even reduce that commitment.





The collapse of any regime linked to the Soviet Union would contradict the
"inevitable march of history", and result in a considerable loss of
prestige. Finally, Soviet policy was counterproductive. As Vladimir
Stanchenko notes,
In retrospect, it is clear that the introduction of Soviet arms into
the region was the least acceptable way to consolidate ostensibly pro-
Soviet forces at a time when other actors in Latin America and Western
Europe were trying to support and help leftist movements gain a firm
economic and political base. Instead, the growing Soviet presence in
the region led to a somewhat deeper polarization of forces in Central
America and made pro-Soviet groups rather more vulnerable.
Thus, Soviet policy resulted in a costly competition with the United States.
Its effect was not only to undermine the authority of the American government.
It made the Soviet position untenable as well. As a result, "novoe myshlenie'
or "new thinking" was born.
New thinking on the part of the Soviets is driven by this cost/benefit
analysis. It is a radical change in both the theory and practice of Soviet
foreign policy, especially as it applies to the areas of regional conflicts
and arms control. It recognizes that Soviet interests would be better served
by reducing involvement in regional conflicts (both direct and indirect) and
by agreeing to arms control, thereby cutting its losses, lessening
international tensions, bringing a halt to the arms race, and allowing the
Soviets to establish beneficial economic ties with the West. Such change was
n
essential given the increasingly critical situation within the Soviet Union.
ia
. Atkins, op. cit.
, p. 101.
. Vladimir Stanchenko, "The Soviet Union and Central
America", The Washington Quarterly , Summer 1990, p. 199.
12
. Jiri Valenta, "'New Thinking' and Soviet Policy in Latin
America", The Washington Quarterly . Spring 1990, pp. 135-138.
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This policy change became evident as early as February 1986, when Mikhail
Gorbachev declared that Afghanistan was a "bleeding sore" at the Communist
Party's Twenty- seventh Congress.
However, the one area in which this new thinking has been slow to take
root is in Central America and the Caribbean, especially with regards to Cuba.
As recently as June 1990, Secretary of State James Baker noted that while
events elsewhere have been viewed quite favorably,
We (the Bush administration) are still concerned, however, about
Soviet support for Cuba and Cuban support for the rebels in El
Salvador. Continued Soviet military assistance for Cuba is a striking
exception to the Soviet Union's "new thinking" on regional issues.
That the United States government views US-Soviet cooperation in this region
as essential is clear. A considerable effort has been made to resolve the
issues. Over time, one can be optimistic that these efforts will succeed.
Yet, as noted above, progress is being made rather slowly.
One reason the Soviet Union has been slow to abandon its relationship
with Cuba is that the costs are not as great as they might appear. Although
some US sources estimate that Soviet aid to Cuba totals some $5 billion per
year, the figure is somewhat misleading. For one thing, the CIA bases its
figures on the official US-Soviet exchange rate, which is 10 to 15 times more
13
. Carol R. Saivetz, "'New Thinking' and Soviet Third World
Policy", Current History . October 1989, p. 325.
. James Baker, "Recent Developments in US-Soviet
Relations", Current Policy No. 1285, Bureau of Public Affairs,
State Department, June 1990, p. 3.
15
. Michael Kramer, "Anger, Bluff and Cooperation", Time .
June 4, 1990. For instance, when Bernard Aronson took his first
trip as the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American
Affairs in June 1989, his destination was not Central America
(the area of his responsibility), but Moscow where he met with
his Soviet counterpart, (p. 40)
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than the ruble is worth on the Soviet black market. In addition, Moscow does
not grant any aid in the form of hard currency. Rather, it extends credits
that Cuba uses to barter for Soviet goods, some of which could not be sold on
the open market. While Cuba receives petroleum at below market prices (after
refining it, any surplus is sold on the world market for cash), over 70% of
that subsidy is returned in the form of sugar, and the Soviets receive citrus
products and nickel as well. As arms control requires the Soviet Union to
reduce its inventory, Cuba could be a convenient outlet. None of this
suggests that the Soviet Union will not limit support to its Cuban ally, only
that it need not do so.
A more important reason that Soviet support for Cuba has been
exceptionally strong is political. Gorbachev faces strong opposition from
hardliners within the Soviet Union to any overtures that risk losing its
strategic position in Cuba. Futhermore, there is strong support from those
who believe that Cuba has been a reliable ally over the last three decades.
Soviet editor Sergo Mikoyan summed up this position when he wrote,
New political thinking does not mean a break in the commitment,
traditional friendship, and special relations the Soviet Union shares
with Cuba. The Soviet Union cannot sacrifice its conscience, self-
respect, and self-image by betraying friends in order to win someone's
appreciation.
. Wayne Smith, "Washington Vexed by Soviet Support of
Castro, but the Subsidy Will Continue", Los Angeles Times . May
13, 1990. For the value of the Soviet ruble on the black market
see "Ruble Shrinks Again", Wall Street Journal , November 13,
1989, and John Valentine, "Analysts See Soviets Backing Ruble
with Gold", Wall Street Journal . December 11, 1989.
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For these reasons, the Soviet Union has been hesitant to unilaterally abandon
its position in the Caribbean and Central America. The Soviets seek
assurances from the United States that it will not take advantage of the
situation. As such, the Soviet Union has endorsed a negotiated settlement to
the conflicts in Central America, and it has suggested that it will end its
subsidies to Cuba, provided the United States lifts its economic embargo
19
against the Castro regime.
For the Bush administration, this may be difficult to do. The Cuban
community in Florida is bitterly opposed to any type of a deal that leaves
Castro in power, and they have considerable influence in the Republican
party. However, the Bush administration is most interested in reducing its
defense commitments (and therefore liabilities) in the region. It has backed
regional negotiations in Central America, and it hopes that its talks with the
Soviets will pay off with the eventual liberalization of the Cuban
government. There is good reason to believe that the United States and the
Soviet Union will come to an accomodation over the area. It is clearly in
both nations' interest to do so. By offering the Soviets something in return,
such as the cessation of TV Marti, the United States could give the Soviet
10
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supporters of the Central American peace plan since 1987. For
notes from a speech given by Yuri Pavlov, the head of the Latin
American Department of the Soviet Ministry see, Sandra Dibble,
Fred Tasker and Mimi Whitefield, "Exiles Press Soviets for Change
in Cuba", Miami Herald . May 27, 1990. See also, Al Kamen, "US
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Union the justification it needs to bow out gracefully.
Of course, this may not even be necessary. The increasing entropy of the
Soviet Union may well lead to its disintegration. In this scenario, support
for Castro could well become a non-issue. Subsidies would end, not because
the Soviets were seeking closer ties with the West, but because they could no
longer deliver their goods. There are already signs this is beginning to
occur. By the summer of 1990 the Soviets were nearly 14 million barrels (two
months supply) short in their crude oil deliveries to Cuba, due almost
11
exclusively to problems within the Soviet Union. As the situation becomes
more desperate, support for Cuba would continue to decline.
The question, then, is what impact all these changes will have on US
security interests in the Caribbean and Central America. The answer would
appear to be a favorable one in that a major source of support for anti-
American movements is removed. The reality, though, is that the region is far
more problematic than most Americans might think, with the changes bringing
less results than one might hope. The overall impact, however, is likely to
be positive.
Several factors indicate that the end of US-Soviet competition in the
region is likely to have less of an impact than one might wish. For one
thing, the two successful insurrections in the region (the Cuban and
Nicaraguan revolutions) occured with virtually no Soviet support. Castro did
22
. "Drastic Action to Offset Oil Shortage", Latin American
Weekly Report . September 13, 1990, p. 10, and "Cuba Cuts Fuel
Consumption as Soviet Oil Deliveries Fall", Washington Post .
August 30, 1990.
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not even call himself a communist until after he had seized power in 1959.
In regards to Nicaragua, David Nolan observed that "had the Sandinistas not
been exposed to Marxism, they would have found or created another paradigm on
which to construct their ideological vision". And unlike events in Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union, where communism confronted nationalist
aspirations, nationalism within Cuba and Nicaragua is closely identified with
25their revolutions and with the leaders themselves.
As long as there are revolutionaries in Latin America, the potential for
the support of insurgencies will continue to exist. Castro has stated his
support for the "liberation" of peoples against "imperialist" forces on
numerous occasions, and this support is manifest under Article 12 of the 1976
Cuban Constitution. Likewise, the Sandinistas, who remain the most powerful
single force in Nicaraguan affairs, have demonstrated their willingness to
support insurgencies. In one of their original declarations they pledged to
promote the "struggle for a true union of the Central American peoples within
For an account of the Cuban revolution from the
revolutionaries' perspective, see Ramon L. Bonachea and Marta San
Martin, The Cuban Insurrection. 1952-1959 , (Transaction Books:
New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1974).
24
. David Nolan, The Ideology of the Sandinistas and the
Nicaraguan Revolution . 3rd printing (Institute of Interamerican
Studies: University of Miami Press, 1988), p. 123.
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one country, beginning with support for national liberation movements in
27
neighboring states". One would expect such comradery to continue.
By the same token, insurgent movements have been suspicious of external
actors, especially the Soviet Union. Many have wondered about the Soviets'
commitment to revolution. As one Honduran leftist put it, "revolutions are
like people. They lose passion. Russia is old, bureaucratic and corrupt."
Other guerrillas have never forgiven the Soviet Union for its "betrayal"
29during the Cuban missile crisis. Some even question Cuban motives. Fabio
Castillo, founder of the Central American Revolutionary Workers Party quipped,
"the Cubans are arrogant. Why should we fight United States domination only
30
to accept Cuban domination?"
In response, guerrillas have resisted the temptation to rely on any one
source. An arms network has been established. Some groups, such as the FMLN
in El Salvador, have stockpiled enough ammunition to last for years, and they
can now train and organize themselves. They have, in other words, become
independent. It is as if insurgent groups had anticipated the eventual US-
Soviet accomodation all along.
However, the impact of the fundamental changes within the Soviet Union
and in its foreign policy has indeed been profound. The dismal failure of the
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Soviet model and the rejection of communist ideology by Eastern Europe must,
if anything, force insurgent groups in the Caribbean and Central America to
reassess their position. Hopefully, they will come to the conclusion that
their best hope lies in integrating themselves into the World economy, and in
accepting peaceful coexistence. Even if it does not, without the massive
support of some patron power, pariah states in the region that desire to
support insurgencies will be forced to pay more attention to internal economic
matters just in order to survive. The export of revolution will become
increasingly ever more problematic.
What this all means for United States' security in regards to the region
will only become clear after some time has passed. It should, however, lead
to a lower level of intensity for conflict in the region. The causes of
instability have not been removed, and they are far from being solved. But
events may allow change to occur at a more manageable pace.
Perhaps the best result from all of this is that the United States no
longer need view the region in terms of the East-West conflict. The US will
thus be more apt to accept independent neighbors, and better placed to support
needed social change (assuming, of course, that there is continued interest in
the region). There would, then, be less of a perceived need for insurgent
groups to distance themselves from the United States, and this could help
reduce tensions. Whether this will equate to increased US involvement in
democratic transitions, or a decrease in its interest in the region (benign
neglect), remains to be seen. What is clear is that the legacy of Guatemala
in 1954 has been an unfortunate one. It would be historic if that watershed
could be passed.
With the enormous changes that have taken place, a longer term
23
perspective by policy makers in the United States is now more possible.
Should they look to the long term, and choose to support democratic government
in Latin America now that the Cold War is over, what kind of an approach would
be the most effective? To examine this question, as well as the others posed
in the introduction, the thesis now turns to the case studies on Chile,
Brazil, and El Salvador.
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III. CHILE
"Where every man in a state has a vote, brutal laws are impossible."
Mark Twain
The United States has been interested in influencing the orientation of
Chilean government since its independence movement began in September 1810.
Later that century, Secretary of State James G. Blaine's efforts to mediate
the V/ar of the Pacific in 1880, ultimately won by the Chileans, and American
support for President Jose Manuel Balmaceda during the civil war of 1891,
ultimately won by the opposition, made Chile's relations with the United
States "less than cordial."
American investments in Chile expanded rapidly in the beginning of the
20th century, from approximately $5 million in 1900 to nearly $200 million in
1914. By 1930 American investors had controlled the overwhelming share of
mining interests, including almost 90 percent by value of Chilean copper
production, and 70 percent of all foreign investment in Chile. Commerce with




With increased investment, American involvement in Chilean politics
intensified. Beginning in the 1930s the United States used various political
and economic pressures and rewards to limit the scope of the Chilean communist
. Brian Loveman, Chile; The Legacy of Hispanic Capitalism ,




party, which was founded in 1922. 3 After World War II these efforts took on
increasing importance. American influence was used to encourage Chile to
break off diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and
Czechoslovakia, and shortly thereafter, the US supported the Chilean
government when it passed the Law for the Permanent Defense of Democracy in
1948, officially outlawing the Communist party.
By forcing the Communists underground, the Law for the Permanent Defense
of Democracy did the Chilean government considerably more harm than good, so
prior to the 1958 election the law was lifted by then outgoing President
Carlos Ibanez. In the ensuing election, Socialist candidate Salvador Allende
was narrowly defeated by a coalition of liberals and conservatives who
supported Jorge Alessandri. Concern for a possible Communist victory in the
future led the United States to vigorously apply its Alliance for Progress to
Chile, a program that attempted to counteract the appeal of the Cuban
Revolution throughout the rest of Latin America. One aspect of the program
was agrarian reform, and in the 1960s the United States put pressure on the
Alessandri government to adopt a land reform program. It is important to note
that land reform was the single most bitterly resisted policy by the Chilean
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In 1964 the US government used covert means to help finance the electoral
campaign of Eduardo Frei, a Christian Democrat who favored land reform.
While providing generous incentives for investment to foreign capital, the new
government also successfully introduced programs for agrarian reform and
agricultural unionization, which finally cleared Congress in 1966-67. In
addition, virtually all parts of the political spectrum supported legislation
for the "Chileanization" of the copper industry, which most felt was being
exploited by Americans at the expense of Chile. The United States government
felt that any further turn to the left would be detrimental to American
interests.
In the 1970 election campaign between Salvador Allende and Jorge
Alessandri, the United States took extensive efforts to influence the outcome.
The Central Intelligence Agency spent nearly three and one half million
dollars to organize anti-Allende propaganda, subsidize conservative Chilean
news media, buy votes, and bribe Chilean congressmen, who according to the
constitution had the authority to choose from among the candidates if there
was no majority. Following the electoral victory by Allende on September 4,
1970, the CIA made twenty-one contacts with key military and police officers
to help prevent Allende from assuming the presidency. Despite these efforts,
Allende was confirmed as president of the democratically elected socialist
K Kalevi Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for
Analysis . 5th ed
.





government on October 26, 1970.
Immediately, the American government began efforts to destabilize the
Allende government. With activists from China, the Soviet Union, Cuba, and
other communist sympathizers throughout Latin America flooding into Chile, the
United States began to fear that Chile would serve as a base for South
American revolutionaries. American multinational firms, such as International
Telephone and Telegraph, began to put pressure on the American government to
take action against a socialist government that was certain to exert control
over private interests. The subsequent nationalization of American-owned
copper mines, and many other firms (state control of industries increased from
31 in November 1970 to 285 in May 1973 ) 9 , encouraged the US to cut back
credits and new loans to Chile via the Export-Import Bank, the Inter-American
Development Bank, and the World Bank. The CIA continued to channel funds to
the opposition press (which Allende tried to control), opposition politicians,
private firms, and trade unions, and it helped organize street demonstrations
and support a truckers' strike that adversely effected the Chilean economy.
By encouraging conditions that might exacerbate instability caused by
Allende 's policies, the US helped create an atmosphere that eventually led to
a military coup in September 1973.
. Genaro Arriagada, Pinochet; The Politics of Power
(Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988), p. 85. In the 1970 election,
Allende received 36.3 percent of the vote, compared to 34.9
percent of the vote for Alessandri, and 27.8 percent of the vote
for the Christian Democrats' candidate, Radomiro Tomic. Chile's
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Whereas most Western European countries distanced themselves from the
Chilean government in the first years of military rule, the Nixon and Ford
administrations supported the Pinochet government by backing multilateral
loans to the government. As compared to $67 million received by the Allende
government from 1971-1973, Chile's financial assistance rose to $628 million
from 1974-1976. Certain factors, however, were working against continued
support: The increased knowledge in the United States of human rights
violations committed by the Pinochet regime; the killing of President
Allende 's exiled foreign minister, Orlando Letelier, along with an American in
September 1976 in Washington, DC, by Chilean secret police; and findings by
the United States Congress, especially within the Select Committee to Study
Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence (the so-called "Church
Committee", named after the Chairman, Senator Frank Church (Democrat-Idaho))
that previous US administrations were being less than forthright about US
involvement in foreign countries, led to a reversal of American foreign
policy.
Though United States foreign policy towards Chile over the years has
clearly been oriented primarily towards protecting American economic
interests, it can also be argued that the US has favored democracy in that
country. US support for its independence in 1810 and for its presidential
system of government in its 1890 civil war, though limited, shows some kind of
support for representative government (though the congressionally-dominated
government that eventually replaced it was no less representative). Aversion
to the possibility of a communist-dominated government since the 1930s can
. Arriagada, Pinochet , op. cit., p. 14
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justifiably be attributed to a concern that such a government would ultimately
usurp the most basic rights of its citizens. Even when the US government
attempted to undermine the Allende government, it did so largely by supporting
opposition groups external to the military. Accusations that the US
government was involved in the coup have been repeatedly denied, and there is
no proof that the CIA either organized or directly supported the coup
d'etat. Furthermore, it could easily have been argued that the military
government would be strictly a transitional one, taking upon itself the
"...patriotic commitment to restore justice, institutionality, and Chilean
identity." As such, American support for Pinochet can be seen as a concern
for law and order, and the establishment of a solid base on which to support a
democratic transition. Whatever the case may be, it is clear that by the
election of President Carter in the fall of 1976 a policy change was needed
and would be forthcoming.
A. PRESIDENT CARTER'S HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY
The goal of ending military rule in Chile (or at least its
liberalization) as a fundamental aim of US policy actually began with Congress
when it passed the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974. In Title IX it states, "US
12
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aid should be used to encourage democratic and local government institutions
within the recipient states." It was amended in 1976 to include a statement
of human rights. In a statement prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Stanley J. Heginbotham of the Library of Congress said,
Frustated with the apparent unwillingness of the Nixon and Ford
Administrations to make human rights conditions abroad a significant
consideration in its foreign policy, Congress passed, in the form of
what have become known as (the) Harkin amendments, legislation
prohibiting, with some qualifications, foreign assistance transfers to
any country whose government engaged in a consistent pattern of gross
violations of human rights.
With President Carter's victory in the 1976 election, the executive branch
joined Congress in making the protection of human rights the nation's highest
foreign policy priority in Latin America. Heginbotham continued,
...the Carter Administration made it clear that it wanted to go beyond
the identification of a limited number of egregious violators and use
its influence incrementally to improve human rights conditions in a
wide range of countries.
It was clear that with the situation in Chile, the United States government
was going to put pressure on the Pinochet government to liberalize its
internal policies.
The difference between a human rights policy and one that encourages a
democratic transition are certainly important, but it is the connection that
is germane to this thesis. Ernest Lefever, Director of the Ethics and Public
. US, Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human
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Policy Center at Georgetown University, argues that there are three
fundamentally different concepts of human rights. The first is a universal
application because it is shared by virtually all cultures. It is founded in
religious or ethical thought and "calls for sanctions against political
authorities and others guilty of genocide, brutalizing innocent people and
similar atrocities." The second is more a result of our "Western democratic
experience" and is therefore shared by a minority of states. Such rights
would include the freedom of religion, movement, speech, press, and assembly;
equality before the law; the concept of being innocent until proven guilty,
including safeguards for accused persons; a judicial system independent from
executive authority, and periodic elections. A third concept refers to
economic rights, such as the right to a job or adequate health care. However,
according to Lefever, these are not so much rights as social objectives.
The goal of influencing a democratic transition, then, is a product of
our Western heritage and the impact this has on our beliefs of human rights.
Democratic government is the means to an end in the sense that it helps
achieve the goal of human rights. That the government's policies were not
limited to the first concept of human rights, but included the others as well
is evident from statements by Carter's Deputy Secretary of State, Warren
Christopher.
Testifying before Congress, Christopher specified three areas in which
the government attempted to integrate human rights considerations into the
foreign policy process: (1) Reporting and evaluating human rights conditions
in various countries; (2) incorporating human rights into both bilateral and
n
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multilateral diplomacy; and (3) linking human rights considerations to foreign
18
assistance programs. That human rights included more than the universal
concept is clear. He said, "...we attach fundamental importance to all three
basic categories of internationally recognized human rights—That is,
personal, economic and political rights."
While reporting and evaluating human rights conditions in various
countries played an important role in publicizing human rights violations,
diplomacy attempted to negotiate their eventual dissolution. However, the
actual carrot and stick approach was applied via the third area listed by
Christopher. A combination of foreign assistance programs and economic
sanctions were used to influence the process towards political liberalization.
Christopher stated, "in distributing the scarce resources of our foreign
assistance programs, we will demonstrate that our deepest affinities are with
nations which commit themselves to a democratic development." For the
Carter administration, you could not have human rights without a democracy.
An interagency group was developed to consider loans and grants to
countries on the basis of human rights. Consisting of representatives from
the Departments of State, Defense, Labor, Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture,
plus the National Security Council, the Agency for International Development.
and any other agencies that might have an interest in the process, such as the
Arms Export Control Board, the interagency group would make a decision based












country, including any positive or negative trend; (2) the political,
economic, and cultural history within that country, with an emphasis on
considering the level of human rights performance that "can reasonably be
expected" in light of that history; (3) fundamental US interests with respect
to that country; (4) the direct benefits of a loan in regards to the needy;
and (5) the effectiveness a decision to defer or oppose a loan would have in
comparison or in combination with other available diplomatic tools for
indicating the country's concern about human rights.
President Carter's human rights policy was supposed to be a framework
within which to influence a transition towards democracy on a world wide
basis. However, as can be seen by the basic factors that influenced decisions
of the interagency group, individual countries were likely to receive
considerably different treatment. Chile's past history of democratic
development, its relative isolation from areas of direct concern to US
national security interests, and the prospect that US pressure might have some
influence within that country ensured that human rights abuses in Chile would
receive a relatively high profile in the administration's foreign policy.
B. CARTER'S POLICY IN REGARDS TO CHILE
The inauguration of President Jimmy Carter in 1977 meant an abrupt change
in US foreign policy in regards to Chile. Although the US Congress had
already voted to terminate all new programs of military assistance and arms
sales to the Chilean government in 1976 as a result of the Letelier killing.
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the Carter administration marked a much greater willingness than the previous
administration to use US influence to increase pressure on the Pinochet
regime. The new administration voted in international organizations to
condemn the Chilean government's human rights policy; it officially received
opposition leaders; and it pressured Chile with sanctions and other diplomatic
7.7
methods to improve the human rights situation."''
It can be argued that US sanctions had some impact on the Pinochet
regime. Genaro Arriagada, a member of the opposition, stated that US pressure
concerning human rights and the need to attract foreign investment into Chile
were two factors that contributed to a moderate political opening in the
summer of 1977. In July of that year Pinochet announced a long term
democratization process in the Chacarillas Address. The following month
Pinochet abolished the DINA, the national intelligence agency responsible for
some of the regime's most publicized human rights violations, including the
killing of Letelier. 23
The effectiveness of administration policies was enhanced by American
labor. The AFL-CIO threatened a boycott after strike activity in Chile from
1977 to 1978 was met with a variety of repressive measures. The inability of
the Chilean government to control workers in government-owned copper mines,
the single most important source of foreign exchange for the country, and the
threat of isolation from US markets because of a refusal by American workers
to offload Chilean shipments led the government to adopt a more relaxed labor






policy in 1979. 2 *
When the Chilean Supreme Court rejected a request in October 1979 for the
extradition of three of the responsible parties in the Letelier killing, the
US government was outraged. The next month the government passed a series of
measures that reduced the size of the US mission in Chile by about one-
quarter, it terminated a military sales pipeline, it eliminated the US
military group in Santiago, it prohibited new Export-Import Bank loans to
Chile and it refused to approve any new activities by the Overseas Private
it
Investment Corporation in Chile. It was clear that in the case of Chile the
Carter Administration was carrying its human rights policy to its logical
extreme
.
The problem with Carter's human rights policy was equally evident. US
ability to influence a military government that has the means and will to
carry out its overall program is rather limited. While Pinochet did propose a
transition process in the Chacarillas Address, it must be remembered that the
process was divided into three stages that were to last 14 years. In
addition, DINA was quickly replaced by the CNI, the National Information
Center, which retained most of the legal privileges enjoyed by DINA. In
this sense, changes that were supposedly the result of pressures from the
United States were more cosmetic than substantive. In addition, pressure
against the Chilean government during the labor strikes was more a consequence
. Loveman, Chile . op. cit., p. 333.
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of American workers than the US government itself. Perhaps the greatest
miscalculation made by the Carter Administration was in the use of its heavy
handed tactics to force the Chilean government on a specific issue: The
extradition request concerning the Letelier case.
The reaction in Chile to US sanctions was intense. A foreign affairs
commentator in Brazil noted that prior to a vote in the United States'
Congress to end all US aid to Chile, including an attempt to bar loans to that
country by private banks, the Chilean government publicly reminded the
American government that 76 percent of all foreign investments in Chile were
71American owned. Following the vote, the Chilean Foreign Minister condemned
the sanctions in the strongest of terms:
...The executive branch has done everything within its powers
according to current legislation. It is therefore intolerable that
the US Government—which up to a short time ago was one of the parties
involved in the extradition suit—should appoint itself the only judge
on the merits of its demands.
The United States, first through pressure and now through these
measures, has unsuccessfully tried to make our government interfere
with the powers of the supreme court. Nothing good can be said about
a government which is applying illegal pressure to override a court
ruling. Its efforts to punish are [?useless]. This is the aggressive
and bullying behavior of a government acting with violence and
unfairness against a materially smaller country [words indistinct].
Neither is it clear that these sanctions were in the least bit effective.
Arriagada stated that they had no political effect, being easily compensated
for by a generous flow of loans from US banks to private Chilean economic
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circles. Quoting Pinochet, he pointed out that "the rejection of the White
House and Capitol Hill does not matter as long as my government gets along
well with Wall Street." 29
By the end of the Carter administration, human rights policy began to
show signs of strain. In reference to the five basic factors considered by
the interagency group considering loans and grants on the basis of human
rights, Warren Christopher said, "it should be apparent from these five
principles that we do not rigidly adopt the same approach to foreign
assistance decisions just because two countries have a similar human rights
situation." Herein resided part of the problem: A policy that was based on
something as absolute as human rights was designed to be flexible in order to
meet the changing environment. Contradictions were bound to occur. When they
did they were seen as the hypocritical result of political gamesmanship, and
not as a policy based on high moral standards. Perhaps Stanley Heginbotham of
the Library of Congress summed it up best of all. He testified that.
The case-by-case approach followed by the Administration, combined
with the reluctance to articulate—indeed, apparently even to
formulate
—
principles guiding individual decisions, contributed to
public and congressional concern over the consistency with which the
policy was being pursed.
This inconsistency was seen by many as not serving America's best interests.
What followed was a fundamentally different approach by the new administration
of President Ronald Reagan.
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C. THE REAGAN APPROACH
President Reagan entered office with an entirely different mandate than
did President Carter. Rather than having to deal with the overwhelming guilt
many Americans felt in regards to the Vietnam War and Watergate, the Reagan
administration was confronted with the immediate consequences of the
Ayatollah, the Sandinistas, and Afghanistan. To put it simply, instead of
concentrating on ethical issues, the new administration was concerned with
American national security.
One of the first comprehensive critiques of Carter's human rights policy
was made by Ernest Lefever of Georgetown University. In July 1979 he appeared
before Congress, noting that there were six major problems with the Carter
approach: (1) It underestimated the totalitarian threat; (2) it confused
totalitarianism with authoritarianism, arguing that "there is far more freedom
of choice, diversity of opinion and activity. .. in an authoritarian state than
in a totalitarian one", and there is a greater "...capacity of authoritarian
rule to evolve into democratic rule"; (3) it overestimated America's influence
abroad; (4) it confused domestic and foreign policy; (5) it ignored the perils
of reform intervention; and (6) it distorted foreign policy objectives." On
the final point he was particularly adamant. He said:
The lopsided application of human rights criteria is justified by
White House and State Department spokesmen on pragmatic grounds. They
frankly admit that they give more critical attention to allies than to
adversaries because they have more leverage over the former—we can
withhold or threaten to withhold aid from our friends, so why not





administer the two-by-four to a mulish friend.
Lefever did not necessarily criticize the goals of the Carter administration,
but its effects. It was the alienation of allies that was his major concern.
It was a policy that played into the Soviets' hands. In ending his testimony
he surmised,
The entire human rights crusade is replete with irony because what is
done in the name of virtue may lead to dire consequences ... it is not
inappropriate to recall the words of columnist Michael Novak: "One of
the best ways to create an immoral foreign policy is to try too hard
for a moral one."
These concerns were addressed by appointing individuals sympathetic to
this viewpoint in numerous positions, including ambassadors to the United
Nations, Jeane Kirkpatrick and later, LT GEN Vernon Walters, US Army
(Retired). The change in policy was basically a result of the critiques of
the Carter administration: First, Carter's criticisms and punitive measures,
far from assisting democratic forces within Nicaragua and Iran, had isolated
the countries' leaders and ultimately led to their overthrow by more radical
anti-American forces; and second, public criticism was an ineffectual way to
get pro-Western regimes to liberalize. The new administration would
encourage forces that sought a long term transition towards democracy, but
only in a way which did not adversely disrupt regional stability, and in a
manner that did not feed public expectations. The problem was that it
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In the November 1979 issue of Commentary
. Jeane Kirkpatrick published the
article "Dictatorships and Double Standards" which launched her political
career. In that and a subsequent article, "US Security And Latin America",
Kirkpatrick espoused the principles that she believed should be the basis of
America's Latin American policy. She reasoned the United States had to think
more realistically about the politics of Latin America; that the alternatives
to existing governments, and the amounts and kinds of aid and time required to
improve the lives and expand the liberties of the people in Latin America
often left the United States with unattractive choices. As such, the US had
to abandon the hopes of creating democracies in countries where "the realities
of culture, character, geography, economics, and history" made such
developments problematic. Therefore, the aim of the United States should be
to "assess realistically the impact of various alternatives on the security of
the United States and on the safety and autonomy of the other nations of the
hemisphere. " 36
Vernon Walters was similar to Jeane Kirkpatrick in that he viewed the
process towards democratization as primarily an internal matter that had to be
resolved by the actors involved. Though he seemed to be somewhat more
optimistic that democracy could eventually flourish in Latin America, he was
also cautious to point out that the US could do more harm than good in trying
to force the issue. He articulated those thoughts by saying.
The United States is seen by all Latin Americans, whether of
right or left, as largely a big power that tries to push them around
and the only thing that they often agree on is that they will resist
that pressure. .
.
If we really want to change this, and if we really want to get
better human rights, I don't think we can do it by increasing
36
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harshness. I am not aware of any case in history where these types of
external sanctions have had any real effect on a country other than,
as I say, to rally the people around their government.
Walters believed that in order for the US to effectively influence any
transition towards democracy, it had to do so quietly and patiently. To push
too hard was to be counterproductive. Policy was based on results, not
standards.
Reagan administration policy towards Chile largely followed these
precepts. In the first few years it was extremely reluctant to criticize the
Pinochet regime, but eventually did so after an increase in human rights
abuses in 1982. By 1985 the administration wholeheartedly endorsed a
transition to democracy, but it never went to the extremes pursued by the
Carter administration. The administration's approach became, in retrospect, a
mixture of the Carter and early Reagan years.
D. REAGAN'S POLICY IN REGARDS TO CHILE
President Reagan began his term by trying to improve the relations with
Chile that had been so strained during the Carter administration. In February
1981 his administration lifted the prohibition on Export-Import Bank dealings
with Chile and reinstated the invitation to the Chilean Navy to participate in
Operation Unitas, a US-sponsored hemispheric naval exercise that the Chilean
Navy had been excluded from in 1980 as a result of the Letelier extradition
rebuff. Military aid, though, was not reinstated because of congressional
37
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However, the greatest change was one of rhetoric. In August 1981 the
administration sent Kirkpatrick to meet with Pinochet. It was described as
one of the most cordial visits his regime ever had. The visit was also
unusual in that Kirkpatrick failed to meet with any of the democratic
opposition, the first high level US official in some time that refused to do
so. She was "rewarded", some forty-eight hours after her visit, when Pinochet
exiled the president of the Chilean Commission for Human Rights, Jaime
Castillo. 38
This action certainly caused some personal embarrassment for Kirkpatrick.
She had obviously followed her own analysis, as well as others, to its logical
extreme. While there were many benefits to this low profile approach, the
apparent weaknesses were made manifest. The US could not afford to ignore the
opposition. Otherwise, its credibility as a nation seeking the best way to
promote human rights would be severly undermined. Clearly, some compromise
was needed.
According to the Chilean press, a report on the first two years of the
Reagan administration released in January 1983 listed priorities for American
foreign policy. The highest priorities were given to maintaining world peace,
focusing on international economic issues, and addressing relations with the
Soviet Union. The encouragement and promotion of democracy in Latin America
was listed in fifth place. 33 Thus, from their perspective, a major reason
. Arriagada, Chile . op. cit., p., 46.
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that relations with Chile took such a low profile was that the emphasis in the
Reagan administration was on other issues. This relatively low priority is in
striking contrast to the major emphasis human rights had received during the
Carter administration.
By late 1982, however, forces within the Reagan administration had
started to change. According to Chilean political analyst Heraldo Munoz, the
failure of the Chilean government to take concrete actions for a political
opening, and an increase in repression that began in 1982 made it difficult
for the Reagan administration to continue its "silent diplomacy" towards
Chile. In one important change, the US State Department released 14
declarations concerning human rights in 1983. In March 1984 the pressure
was increased again when Stephen Bosworth, head of a US Department of State
delegation, stated publicly in Chile that the United States wanted to see a
peaceful transition towards democracy in that country, adding that "the people
must be allowed to participate in the transition process."
When the Pinochet government declared a state of siege in November 1984,
the growing disapproval of the Reagan administration led to further changes,
particularly in personnel. In May 1985 Elliot Abrams, the former US Secretary
of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, replaced Langhorne Motley
(whom members of the opposition called a "Pinochet sympathizer") as Assistant
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. In August of that year, James
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Theberge, whose close ties with Pinochet had virtually cut him off from the
Chilean opposition, was replaced by Henry Barnes, a career diplomat who was
seen in Chile as being better able to work with the opposition.
These changes marked the unequivocal end to Reagan's "silent diplomacy"
strategy towards Chile. In 1985 Ambassador Barnes protested Pinochet's regime
by attending a service for victims of police brutality. Later, the US
abstained from approving loans to Chile by the World Bank and Inter-American
Development Bank. In the United Nations the US supported a condemnation of
Chile's human-rights policies, and in December 1987 the government issued a
strong statement which called on Chile to hold free elections. In addition,
Congress authorized $1 million for the opposition in the 1988 plebiscite (to
decide whether or not to continue with the Pinochet regime).
Throughout this period it is evident that Congress was more willing than
the Reagan administration to apply public pressure on the Pinochet regime.
Relations were particularly strained between the executive and legislative
branches during the first few years, but even after the appointment of Elliot
Abrams the administration was hesitant to apply economic sanctions. The
administration argued that the adverse effects created by that type of
pressure would fall heaviest on those least able to afford it. Others
outside the administration argued that sanctions were exactly what was needed
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to bring about substantive change. One factor not mentioned by critics of
the administration, however, was that the sanctions applied by Congress had,
after a decade, left the US with little leverage. By 1988 one of the few
options left was to raise tariffs on apples, grapes and kiwis, the products of
Chile which had replaced copper as its chief area of exports to the United
States. 46
Effects on the opposition in Chile during the Reagan administration are
somewhat ambiguous. Arriagada argued that whereas the first few years of
Reagan's policies led to the deterioration in the morale and outlook of the
opposition, the changes in personnel in 1985 were seen as a major setback for
the Pinochet regime. Other politicians within the moderate opposition saw
it much the same way. They stated that later American officials indicated
they had "a more balanced appreciation of the Chilean situation than earlier
ones." On several occasions, members of the moderate opposition sought US
assistance. In August 1983 some 100 students staged a demonstration outside
the US Consulate in Santiago, requesting help for the Chilean transition
ifl
process. In May 1985 former Foreign Minister Gabriel Valdes, a Christian
Democrat, asserted that the US could do a lot more to help restore democracy,
45
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although he and other members of the opposition opposed outright
intervention. The opposition was disappointed with the aid that it received
from Congress for the 1988 plebiscite, though this was due more to the fact
that of the $1 million earmarked for the opposition, only $600,000 was
received, while the other $400,000 virtually disappeared. It does, however,
note the interest in obtaining US support.
The Chilean left was understandably much more hostile. The Popular
Democratic Movement (MDP) seemed unlikely to forgive, let alone forget, the
role by the US in the ousting of Allende. A communique issued by the group in
November 1983 stated that "the only objective of the US interventionist
offensive is to defend its interests by preserving a system of domination
CI
whose nefarious effects principally burden the popular sectors."
The communist Chilean economist, Jose Cademartori, was even more
explicit. He exclaimed,
Pinochet's dictatorship—and this is something that Chile has not
forgotten— is a creature of US imperialism. Therefore, they are
responsible for the crimes; they are responsible for 10 years of
poverty, exploitation, and suffering by the Chilean people. There can
be no reconciliation; there can be no effort to incorporate the Yankee
officials in the solutions that the Chilean people need and seek for
their problems. Any effort to involve the US ambassador—who is a
well-known element, a well-known CIA agent, and an official of the US
banks— is prejudicial to the interests of our people. Chile needs a
50
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solution to its problems based on its own needs.
Though given as part of an interview in Cuba, and maybe therefore as more
propaganda than substance, it still underscores the difficulty the US would
have in influencing members of the left.
These same sentiments are seen as late as 1986, when Jose Sanfuentes, the
Secretary General of the MDP, denounced US efforts to influence a transition
in the strongest terms. He said it was the very clear mission of Ambassador
Barnes to "maintain Pinochet's dictatorship."
Yet even here there may be hope. Pamela Constable and Arturo Valenzuela
argued in the Winter 1989/90 issue of Foreign Affairs that even the socialist
left had moderated its tone, seeing a positive US element in the departure of
Pinochet, coming to understand the complexities of US foreign policy, and
identifying more with the moderate socialism of contemporary Europe. How
long the Chilean left will distrust Washington remains to be seen.
E. TOWARDS THE CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY
Since Patricio Aylwin's victory in the December 1989 election the attempt
to consolidate democracy has been primarily an internal matter. Two of the
major issues facing his government have been resolving the issue of human
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rights abuses of the Pinochet regime, and establishing civilian control over
the military, which is one of Przeworski's conditions for democratic
consolidation (see introduction). Maintaining business confidence, while
addressing the concerns of the average Chilean, has also been a high priority.
The latter is important to the consolidation of democracy because it sets a
precedent for the institutionalization of economic conflicts. While the
United States may not be able to play a direct role, it can provide support on
the periphery, especially as it concerns economic growth.
Shortly after the December election Chilean emissaries met with leaders
in the United States and Western Europe. The issue was not a specific plea
for financial aid, for which Chile was too well off to qualify, but a request
for a more generalized type of support. Noting that Chile was in the midst of
a delicate transition, those emissaries merely pointed out that "they would
like to be able to count on support." To their dismay, such support from
the United States was slow in coming.
After assuming office in March 1990, the Chilean government had expected
that US trade and diplomatic sanctions designed to pressure the Pinochet
regime would quickly be removed. Among the issues of contention were US trade
sanctions that imposed duties on some Chilean exports to the United States,
and the Kennedy Amendment, which banned the sale of US military equipment. By
the fall of 1990 those issues had not been resolved. One Chilean official
warned, "the Americans don't seem to realise how rapidly anti-US sentiment can
be whipped up in Chile. If they do not give ground, it will harm them as much
56
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Another issue that had exacerbated tensions was a ban on Chilean fruit,
imposed by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) after two grapes had been
found to contain cyanide. This ban caused an estimated loss of over $300
million to Chile's exporters. With some members of Congress looking on, the
US General Accounting Office (GAO) supported the FDA decision. However, a
study released later by the University of California at Davis indicated that
the high volatility of cyanide, with its rapid rate of dissipation, meant that
CO
the grapes had been contaminated while they were in FDA hands. The refusal
of US officials to address this grievance only added to the problem.
This was particularly perplexing because relations with other countries
had improved dramatically. In 1990 President Aylwin received warm greetings
when he addressed the United Nations General Assembly. In contrast, during
Pinochet's tenure UN delegates would abandon the hall in protest whenever his
envoy took the floor. During that year Aylwin also visited virtually every
country in Latin America, his government re-established relations with Mexico,
and an investment treaty was signed to promote joint ventures with Spain. In
addition, President Aylwin was formally invited to join the Group of Rio, a
eg
prestigious forum of democratically elected Latin American presidents. The
United States was clearly out of step with the way the rest of the world was
greeting Chile's return to democratically elected government.
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Continued US sanctions were incomprehensible to Chilean officials.
Finance Minister Alejandro Foxley noted, "...we were not responsible for the
human rights problems that generated US sanctions. Yet, it has taken eight
months to get the first signs that something will change. This frustrates
Chileans." This statement is telling. What upset the Chileans was not the
idea of sanctions per se, but the way in which they were applied. In other
words, it was alright to push for liberalization, but the final phase, that of
democratic consolidation, deserved encouragement. For Chileans, continued
pressure would not contribute to the improvement of the situation, whatsoever.
It appears that in this stage, the carrot may be more effective than the
stick.
By the end of 1990 the United States government had begun to respond. In
October, both countries formally agreed to create an intergovernmental council
on trade and investment, including cooperation on the current Uruguay Round
trade negotiations at the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. In
December, the ban on military equipment transfers was lifted. In a compromise
between Congress and the administration, the United States gave President
Aylwin's government several volumes of evidence pertaining to the Letelier
assassination, although it remains to be seen whether the Chilean Supreme
Court will reverse its earlier decision to refuse the US request for
extradition. In addition, the White House, with congressional consent,
announced that the 1987 trade sanctions would be lifted. Administration
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officials also suggested that under the Enterprise for the Americas
initiative, Chile would be eligible for debt forgiveness for money owed the
United States government, which currently amounts to nearly $500 million.
Much of the delay in American support can be explained by bureaucratic
inertia. Yet some of the problems also stem from the congressional role in
the American foreign policy process. Just as Congress had pressured the
Reagan administration into "getting tougher" on Pinochet, so too it may have
hampered the Bush administration's favorable response to such a successful
transition. Only after close consultation with Congress could the
administration lift the trade sanctions and the ban on military equipment, and
this delay caused hard feelings among many people in Chile who had sacrificed
dearly for a democratic transition. Clearly, Congress has the right and
obligation to work with the President on matters of foreign policy, and one
understands that this is the price of a sharing of powers. However, matters
such as these indicate there should be more efficient processes to change
foreign policies when conditions warrant.
F. CONCLUSION
The United States has a definite role to play in the process of a
democratic transition in countries where it has some influence, but that role
is difficult to define. Furthermore, after being defined it must be followed
with utmost care and caution. It would appear that a compromise between the
high profile given to human rights by the Carter administration, and the
. Charles Green, "Bush Hails Chile as Model for Rest of




"silent diplomacy" of the Reagan administration would provide the most
effective support in influencing a transition. Perhaps some final conclusions
drawn from these periods are in order.
The primary responsibility for affecting a transition to democracy, and
also the credit for its success, lies with actors internal to the situation.
While exiles may be able to influence world public opinion and should likewise
receive our moral backing, it is those individuals who apply internal pressure
that most deserve the support. When Pinochet declared that "no foreigner,
however powerful, can impose his will", he revealed a telling statement.
Pressure should be applied not only for the purpose of influencing the
government, but for supporting the opposition, as well. Otherwise, as Vernon
Walter noted, the result may be to rally the people around their government.
If the US government does decide to apply sanctions it must keep several
points in mind. Sanctions appear to be most appropriate for influencing the
liberalization of a regime. There is no evidence that they assisted
democratization, and there is some evidence that it was actually
counterproductive when it came to the consolidation of democracy. In
addition, unless sanctions are applied by all parties involved they are
ineffective. The government must not only consider how other nations will
react, it must also remember the relations private industries have with the
government involved. As was seen in Chile, Pinochet viewed Carter
administration policies as less important than the country's relations with
the business sector. It is also of interest that at times American labor was
able to apply as much pressure as was the US government.
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Equally important, sanctions can be counterproductive. Regardless of the
situation, relations between nations are ultimately determined by the
governments in power. The country that applies the sanctions should not carry
policies to the point of severing ties. Again, this relates to supporting the
opposition, not undermining the government, such as occured from 1970-1973.
If one destabilizes the situation in a country to the point that the
government must relinquish power, it must be remembered that someone has to
pick up the pieces. This could be one of the reasons the Pinochet regime was
so repressive. In addition, a sanction used is a sanction lost. In other
words, if sanctions are continually applied to the point of forcing the regime
in power to become independent, later influence attempts will be less
effective. The basic point concerning sanctions is that they should be used
judiciously and as a means of last resort.
Another issue in regards to influencing a transition is that no single
incident should set the agenda. To place the success or failure of American
foreign policy on one event is extremely risky. As in the Letelier case, it
can cause a severe strain in relations without producing results. As Vernon
Walters remarked.
If we are really trying to influence them in the sense of obtaining a
change, I don't think it is by further pointing the finger at them
that we will succeed. I think the US Government actions in the
Letelier case were fully reported in the Chilean press. I do not
think there is any Chilean who doesn't realize that the United States
was outraged by this murder on the streets of an American city. I
think we have made the point.
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It may behoove the US to de-emphasize specific issues, while stressing general
trends instead.
One possible instrument to accomplish this compromise lies within the
very nature of the US system. It is not necessarily bad that Congress applies
the pressure it does. It may be useful to use Congress as a sounding board,
expressing our public concern, while in some way encouraging self-restraint in
its ability to direct policy. In that manner, the administration could act as
the moderating power, standing as the force of reason. The US should not,
however, follow the extreme example of Kirkpatrick by refusing to meet with
the opposition, but it should limit action that would reduce US influence in
the future. In this way, the administration would have the actual
responsibility of conducting foreign policy, while being able to use Congress
as an excuse for constraints it would have to follow.
While the United States can influence transitions to democracy in
countries with which it has some influence, the best advice would be to remain
patient. It must remember that other forces outside its control tend to be
more important. For instance, during the Carter administration the countries
of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay were under military
rule for the majority of the time. In contrast, by the summer of 1989 only
Chile was without a democratically elected government. These historical
changes had, undoubtedly, put pressure on the Pinochet regime. Yet, forces
such as these are beyond US control. With these limits in mind, it is
important to remember that external actors do play a role in democratic
transitions. It may be a very limited one, but it is evident nontheless.
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IV. BRAZIL
"Debt is the sink of inequity.
"
German-American adage
United States' interests in Brazil during the 19th century were, for the
most part, limited. It was the first nation to recognize independent Brazil,
which proclaimed its independence on September 7, 1822. However, due to
American opposition to monarchical government, full recognition did not become
official until May 26, 1824/ For the next half-century, relations between
the two countries were rather noneventful.
United States' democratic ideas seem to have played an important role in
the overthrow of the empire from 15 to 17 November 1889. Within two weeks
the State Department instructed the US Minister, Robert Adams, to accord
formal US recognition to the new republic as "soon as the majority of the
people of Brazil shall have signified their assent to its establishment and
maintenance." Formal recognition was granted on January 29, 1890, and by
joint resolution on February 19, 1890, the US Congress congratulated the
people of Brazil on "their just and peaceful assumption of the powers, duties,
and responsibilities of self-government, based upon the free consent of the
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governed, and in their recent adoptation of a republican form of government."
During the years of the First Republic, relations between the United
States and Brazil were good. In comparison to other countries, US economic
interests in Brazil were minor until World War I, and did not become the
dominant foreign interest until World War II. During that period, most
nationalistic impulses were directed against the British, who had important
investments in Brazil, and who often used heavy-handed tactics to secure their
position. The US, on the other hand, was seen as a counterbalance to Brazil's
chief rival, Argentina. As a result, relations between the United States and
Brazil during the years of the First Republic remained cordial.
This situation began to change in the 1930s when Getulio Dornelles Vargas
became Chief of the Provisional Government with support of the military.
Though relations continued to be very good at first, leftist and rightist
forces began to play an important role in the internal politics of Brazil.
Both antidemocratic and anti-US, communists and fascists began to play for
power. In November 1935, communists attempted to establish a new order, but
they were crushed by the government. In 1937 a new authoritarian regime was
established, the Estado Novo, which banned parties, dismissed the Congress,
censored the press, and suppressed elections.
The pro-fascist Estado Novo led to a competition between the US and
Germany for influence in Brazil. The Germans purchased large quantities of
Brazilian agricultural and mineral products in exchange for German
manufactures. In addition, the Germans offered the Brazilians weapons to
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modernize their forces, something the United States was reluctant to do. By
1938, German sales to Brazil exceeded those of the United States. In May of
that year the "Intregralistas" , a radical sector of the officers' corps that
was pro-German, attempted a coup. Though unsuccessful and severly repressed,
it showed the depth of pro-Axis feelings in Brazil, and the need for Vargas to
address these concerns in Brazilian foreign policy.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt chose to avoid putting pressure on the
Vargas regime, and the US persisted in actively courting the Brazilian
government. In exchange for Brazilian assistance, the US eventually provided
supports for the price of coffee, played a critical role in building the Volta
Redonda steel mill, transferred significant amounts of weapons, and aided in
the construction of airfields and other facilities. During World War II US
forces were based in Brazil, military and economic aid proliferated, and
extensive bilateral public and private sector economic cooperation occurred.
Three-fourths of all US military aid to Latin America went to Brazil.
The close cooperation with Brazil during World War II would have profound
effects for the next few decades. While much of the rapport established
throughout that period would benefit US interests, the increased US presence
would also result in friction between the two countries, including a US
propensity to take the relationship for granted. The more the US tried to
pressure Brazil, the greater the tension between the two governments became.
The result was a loss of US influence in Brazil. While these forces would
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apply to US-Brazil relations in general, it would also provide a general
indication of what might occur should the United States push too hard for a
particular course of action.
A. BRAZIL'S DEMOCRACY AND THE ROAD TO THE MILITARY COUP
When Getulio Vargas was forced to resign on October 29, 1945, a new era
of democratic government began. It seemed as if favorable conditions would
allow it to succeed. United States support for a democratic international
environment was conducive to good bilateral relations, the domestic economy
was not experiencing any unusual strain, the armed forces were impressed by
the demise of German and Italian fascism, and the Vargas dictatorship had led
to the emergence a vigorous liberal opposition capable of effective
parliamentary leadership.
The immediate post-war period, perhaps reinforced by the establishment of
democratic government in Brazil in 1946, saw continued close ties between the
two nations. Brazil was solidly behind US Cold War diplomacy, and the
Brazilians actively supported the creation of the Inter-America defense and
security system. From 1945-1954 Brazil ranked second only to Nicaragua in its
voting support in the United Nations for North American positions. Yet,
diplomatic and security issues were of secondary concern to the Brazilian
government. The chief aim was the economic growth and development of the
country, and in this area the US was seen to be as much a constraint on Bra
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aas it was anything else.
From 1946 to 1951 the cooperation between the countries was excellent,
but Vargas's return to power in 1951 marked a turn in the relationship. The
Joint Brazil-US Economic Development commission, established in 1950 to help
finance infrastructure projects through the Export-Import and World Bank, was
disbanded in 1953 after the Brazilians had created the national petroleum
monopoly, Petrobras. As a result, of the $500 million that was projected to
be received by the Brazilians, only $200 million arrived. For the US these
loans were conditional; they were, in effect, an effort to liberalize the
Brazilian economy. For the Brazilians the US was seen as a reneger, and this
was an underhanded attempt by the US government to further project its
influence into another sovereign country. The effect was an increase in
economic nationalism that further strained the relationship.
Throughout the 1950s the situation continued to deteriorate. An anti-US
backlash occurred in 1954 when the threat of a military coup against Vargas
resulted in the suicide of the former dictator. In a note he left behind,
Vargas claimed that sinister domestic and foreign forces were behind his
undoing. Though no proof of US involvement has ever been produced, it was
believed by many Brazilians at the time that the CIA and/or US corporations
were acting to protect their political and economic interests.
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In 1958 President Juscelino Kubitschek proposed a United States-Latin
America long-term multilateral program of economic development, called
Operacao Pan America, which met with considerable skepticism from the
Eisenhower Administration. The United States believed Brazil's economy needed
a better environment for business, not government aid, so in 1958-59 the US
withheld approval of a $300 million loan until Brazil would accept
International Monetary Fund requirements for exchange liberalization and
fiscal austerity. In June 1959 Kubitschek decided against accepting the loan
with strings attached, so he broke off negotiations with the IMF. This event
was used by the political left to demonstrate against what was perceived as
disinterest by the US in Brazil's economic well-being.
US pressure on Brazil to liberalize its economy continued beyond
Kubitschek. Kubitschek, who left heavy external and domestic debts as the
price of his industrialization policies, was succeeded by President Janio
Quadros. Quadros attempted to placate the United States by promoting fiscal
stabilization. He failed in this attempt. It is not surprising, therefore,
that he blamed foreign reactionaries for his downfall. The left, as it had
previously, fingered the US as being the major culprit.
In 1962, under the Goulart administration, the US threatened to envoke
the Hickenlooper Amendment, a rider to the Foreign Aid Bill that obligated the
US to suspend aid to any country that expropriated property belonging to
Americans without the payment of just compensation. Brazil's efforts to
settle related claims in order to avoid the amendment's enactment led to
allegations that the US was only interested in the welfare of its own citizens
12
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and not in the development of Brazil.
The following year the US again offered to provide economic assistance,
but it was so conditioned that it was almost rejected by the Brazilian
ambassador to Washington before he had the chance to consult with his
government. As the Brazilian economy continued to decline, Goulart
abandoned any attempts at a stabilization program, and by mid- 1963, his
government turned increasingly towards the radical left. Thereafter, the
United States cut off economic aid, except for projects in the Northeast that
would benefit anti-Goulart state governments. The US government watched as
the chaotic forces continued to mount, and it discretely encouraged anti-
communist forces to pressure the government, while it kept in close contact
with the Brazilian military. On March 31, 1964, the military overthrew the
government of President Goulart and ended nearly twenty years of democratic
rule.
US attempts to influence the liberalization of the Brazilian economy
during the 1950s and early 1960s could have been a good lesson for later
attempts to influence a transition towards democracy. Two trends that
developed in the Estado Novo made influence attempts by the US extremely
problematic during Brazil's experiment in democracy. The first was an
increase in tension between the executive, which developed "Caesarist
overtones" under Vargas, and forces within parliament that tried to pull
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support of a we 11- structured party system. The second powerful trend that
occurred under Vargas's dictatorship was an enormous increase in bureaucracy
and government intervention.
The failure of the US to influence the economic liberalization of Brazil
seems to be a result of misreading these trends. The US government clearly
saw the result of the increase in Brazil's state apparatus as being
inefficient and inhospitable to US interests. What it may have failed to
consider, however, was the extent to which this had been ingrained into the
system, and the subsequent difficulty in changing it. Any heavy handed
methods to change this rapidly would, therefore, lead to considerable
resistance. In addition, the tension between the executive and legislative
branches was exacerbated when extensive pressure was applied to influence
internal change. Instead of encouraging moderate forces, US pressure for an
all or nothing liberalization of the economy may have helped to fractionalize
politics, thereby encouraging the more radical elements. Perhaps the US
government would have been more successful had it been more sensitive to
Brazilian concerns, and more patient in its deliberations.
The period from 1945 to 1964 indicates that the amount of US involvement
in an economy as large as Brazil's did not necessarily translate into
political influence. Cooperation during the first few years of that period
were excellent, not because the US had political influence, but because
priorities were similar. The Brazilians desired good relations, but they were
not willing to trade control over their development for those relations.
Therefore, when the US began to exert its economic influence in a political
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fashion, the result was not compliance, but defiance. Instead of increasing
access to markets, the United States had contributed to economic nationalism.
Put simply, the amount of American influence on politics in Brazil had been
significantly overestimated by those US officials who desired to see change
within Brazil.
B. DEALING WITH THE MILITARY: THE SUBTLE APPROACH
Two trends became apparent during the two decades of Brazilian democratic
government. The first was an increase in economic nationalism, with a
corresponding rise in political independence in foreign policy for Brazil.
This resulted in a fundamental tension between the United States and Brazil
that was sure to increase any time the US tried to force its way.'' A second
trend of importance was an increased pace in military activism. Military
coups were discussed in 1954, 1955 and 1961, and carried out in 1945 and 1964.
All the major actors in the polity attempted to utilize the military for their
own political needs, so the power of the military as the arbitrating or
moderating institution in the political system increased as conflict
1
increased." The United States may even have helped this trend in the 1960s
by stressing internal security against counterinsurgency, thereby urging the
Brazilian military to become more deeply involved in all sectors of society.
Lowenthal, Partners in Conflict
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In regards to influencing a transition to democracy this meant two things:
The US would have to deal with a politically entrenched military, and any
efforts to pressure the regime would have to be done in such a manner as to
avoid inflaming nationalism.
There is ample evidence that the US inhibited the potentially more
repressive actions of the armed forces during the 1964 coup by supporting
democracy, constitutionalism, and elected governments. For instance, the
generals felt it necessary to insist that they were intervening to save
democracy from the threat of communist dictatorship. Despite having welcomed
the change in government, there is no proof that the US instigated, planned,
directed or participated in the coup itself. Rather, it was primarily the
result of political forces in Brazil that had struggled for control of that
country since 1945.
A message conveying good wishes was sent, not to the military's Supreme
Revolutionary Command, which actually ruled, but to Ranieri Mazzilli, the
President of the chamber of Deputies who assumed the title of acting President
before Goulart left Brazil. Later, at a news conference, on April 3, 1964,
Secretary of State Dean Rusk stated that "...in the case of Brazil... the
succession there occurred as foreseen by the Constitution and we would assume
that recognition is not involved in that particular issue or point."
Although these actions were intended to strengthen the civilian authorities,
they had a different effect. Because they followed the coup so closely, they
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were considered by many to be confirmation of US involvement.
Even though the US government had hoped for a more moderate regime, and
had seen military rule as a last resort, it nontheless actively supported the
military regime of Castelo Branco. In the first year of his rule the US
poured in approximately $500 million in aid, far in excess of the amount given
to any other country in the hemisphere. The regime responded with a series of
Institutional Acts that proclaimed sweeping powers for the military, it packed
the Supreme Court, and it seemingly destroyed the opposition. The
embarrassment of the US government became evident when Under Secretary of
State Thomas C. Mann hinted that the US was transforming the Alliance for
Progress into an alliance for ever- increasing militarization in the Western
hemisphere.
Yet, as long as the Brazilian government maintained close ties with the
US, especially as it concerned US foreign investment, Washington was hesistant
to pressure the military towards returning to democratic rule. This approach
was justified by Ambassador Gordon in July 1967 when he stated.
History will long dispute the merits of the acts of commission
and omission during the past three years in Brazil. Castelo Branco
lacked both the experience and the temperament for genuine popular
leadership, but he did know that the Brazilian body politic had never
recovered from the dictatorship of Getulio Vargas and that some kind
of basic political therapy, if not surgery, was indispensable.
It can be said with assurance that the prospects today for stable
and genuine constitutional democracy in Brazil are far better than
three years ago, or than they would have been if the hard liners had
taken power.
The US clearly had its priorities. The highest priority was to sustain its
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economic influence and this meant maintaining cordial relations with the
Brazilian government. Democracy, from this point of view, would return when
conditions were right. There was no point in forcing an issue that was beyond
US control.
This approach appears to have backfired. In a cable sent by the US
embassy in January 1967 the mesage was clear: "The extent of Castelo Branco's
all-out support for United States policies has served to increase anti-
)A
Americanism rather than to lessen it. " Instead of protecting US interests
in Brazil, a nationalistic reaction caused the underlying difference between
the two states to become manifest. When President Castelo Branco was replaced
by Artur da Costa e Silva, not only did Brazilian foreign policy return to its
more independent course, but the severity of the military dictatorship
increased as well.
By offering no public opposition to the policies of the military regime,
the United States appeared to be supporting that regime. For most observers,
the obvious conclusion was that the only thing that mattered to the United
States government was that other countries towed the party line. The
difficulty of using economic pressure to change political behavior in a
country as large as Brazil has already been shown. Now one sees another
problem. Ignoring the nature of a non-democratic regime just to maintain good
relations draws the antipathy of those opposed to that regime. A little
friction between governments is normal in a state of relations. It is only
when that friction translates into disruptive policy that the damage occurs.
Wesson, Brazil , op. cit., p. 155
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In December 1968 General Golbery do Costa e Silva signed the Fifth
Institutional Act, a decree which declared a state of siege, closed Congress,
imposed press censorship and withheld judicial appeal. The police and
military were used to quell the opposition. The US met this increase in
repression through subtle diplomacy. Ambassador John Tuthill, who had
replaced Lincoln Gordon, met twice privately with Carlos Lacerda, an
opposition leader who was known to have played a role in the overthrow of
three presidents. In addition, the US State Department began to refer to
Golbery' s government as "military dominated". The result was that Costa e
Silva refused to see Ambassador Tuthill, and relations with the United States
became strained. Nevertheless, the United States never openly criticized the
Brazilian government, even though Ambassador Tuthill had pleaded with
Secretary of State Dean Rusk to do so.
President Nixon continued the diplomatic approach. He allowed aid to
fall significantly, and he supported efforts by Ambassador Tuthill to cut the
embassy staff as a sign of protest. However, his administration refused to
claim that these maneuvers were a protest to military rule. The reduction of
aid was the result of "increased selectivity", and cuts in personnel were
attributed to plans to increase efficiency. The closest the US
administration came to outright support for democracy was in the text of a
joint statement delivered when President Emilio Garrastazu Medici visited
Washington. They agreed, "...that the primary goal of an era of peace and
25
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prosperity for the region can be achieved only by cooperation which in turn
must be founded on the principles of freedom and self-determination." The
Nixon administration may have preferred a transition to democracy, but any
pressure that was applied was accomplished in private, or in a manner that
would avoid embarrassing the military regime. It was a policy of patience.
In essence, the Nixon administration publicly ignored the issue of
military government in Brazil. To the extent that it attempted to encourage
political liberalization, its efforts were behind closed doors. In other
words, it appeared that US policy accepted the belief that political
liberalization should be left strictly to the mercy of the government of
Brazil. What else could be done? Clearly, sanctions to liberalize the
economy had only resulted in increased economic nationalism. Would not
pressure for political liberalization have been equally counterproductive?
The answer to these questions is unclear. It should be noted, though, that
sanctions and silence are not the only alternatives.
If it appeared that the United States was applying pressure in a manner
that left the government of Brazil no alternative, then it could have been
used by nationalist forces. If, on the other hand, such pressure was applied
in a manner that did not demand a policy change on behalf of the Brazilians,
but instead only suggested US disapproval, then it may have succeeded. For
example, the United States could have limited its response to public
criticism, especially if used in a sparing fashion. Sanctions are problematic
because they, by definition, demand a policy change. Silence is problematic
because it suggests acquiescence. Open criticism, provided it does not
. "President Medici of Brazil Visits the US", Department
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involve a policy change, appears to be a middle path.
The Ford administration was equally reserved in its criticism. One
justification for this low profile approach might have been that the
repression during the Costa e Silva and Medici presidencies had largely
subsided by the time that Ernesto Geisel had succeeded Medici in 1974. Geisel
had begun to allow a political opening, or "Abertura" , and it would not have
made sense to apply pressure just as the situation was beginning to improve.
In other words, one administration had limited options because of what the
previous administration had chosen not to do. Any open criticism would, at
this time, have appeared inconsistent. A middle path by the Nixon
administration would thus appear to have had other benefits as well.
Another reason the US did not apply greater pressure was the recognition
that Brazil was largely independent of the US, and efforts to influence the
trend towards democracy could have resulted in a backlash. Brazilian
independence was being demonstrated in a number of areas. A foreign policy
that was increasingly oriented toward the Third World, much as Quadros's had
been, made evident the limits of American control. For example, during that
time period Brazil provided support for the MPLA in Angola, it increased
contacts with other nations for trade, including the Soviet Union, and it
registered a pro-Palestinian voting record in the United Nations.
A significant area of contention was over the Brazilian refusal to sign
the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. The Brazilians were keen on reducing
their dependence on foreign oil, so they actively pursued the development of
nuclear power as a national goal. The Brazilians indicated they were willing
28
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to accept US assistance by awarding a contract to Westinghouse for the
construction of Brazil's first nuclear power plant. However, attempting to
control the flow of enriched uranium, the US government attached so many
strings that the Brazilians decided to look elsewhere. In 1975 they signed an
agreement with West Germany, thereby obtaining the necessary items for nuclear
power plant construction. Concerned over the proliferation of nuclear
material, the US tried to prevent the deal. Having failed in that endeavor,
it settled for being able to extract an agreement from both Germany and
Brazil. Both countries pledged that any technology would not be made
available for weapons production.
The manner in which the Ford administration dealt with the nuclear issue,
and the subsequent signing of a memorandum of understanding in 1976,
stipulating that the two powers would consult each other on issues of concern,
are indicative of how the US would try to influence a transition towards
democracy in that period. Like the previous administrations, the US
recognized the limits of trying to influence events. It showed its concern
over sensitive issues, and was capable through diplomatic channels to voice
these concerns. It was not, however, willing to risk a severe strain in a
relationship with a country the US felt was so important. Jimmy Carter was
less subtle.
C. DEALING WITH THE MILITARY: THE CARTER APPROACH
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Two policies had overwhelming implications for US-Brazil relations during
the Carter administration: Nuclear non-proliferation and human rights.
Though Carter's stance against the spread of nuclear capabilities was not
directly related to attempting to influence a transition towards democracy,
his policies are indicative of what might have occurred had he pursued heavy
handedness against the military in that area. His human rights efforts, which
provided the framework to influence a transition towards democracy, were
applied less rigorously to Brazil due to the fact that the human rights abuses
had for the most part subsided.
President Carter decided to make Brazil a showcase in his efforts to
limit nuclear proliferation. As one of his first initiatives he tried to
pressure the West Germans into withdrawing from the agreement, reportedly even
threatening the withdrawal of US troops from West Berlin. When the Germans
balked. Carter sent his Deputy Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, to
reassert US control over the situation. The Brazilians saw this more as an
attempt to protest Westinghouse ' s lost business than to safeguard the world
against nuclear proliferation. As such, Ernesto Geisel used this event to
stir up nationalist sentiment for his own political benefit. For the
Brazilians, it was their right to develop their own nuclear industry. This
attempt by Carter to impose his standards in such an obvious way was clearly a
failure. By late 1977 he had given up on this effort. As David Fleischer
and Robert Wesson put it, "the campaign that the Carter administration briefly
waged against the Brazil-German deal seemed a remarkable exercise in




Had the Carter administration really wanted to affect a paralysis in
Brazil's attempt to build a nuclear power industry, it may have been much more
effective to concentrate on private groups instead. It would have to be done
through private channels, since any efforts by the administration to influence
the internal affairs of another sovereign nation, especially one that was big
and developing, would be seen as intervention. Yet important forces within
Brazil could have made this possible. There was an extensive antinuclear
movement that could have received support from similar groups in the US and
Europe. The delays and cost overruns made the economics of the program
questionable, especially in light of Brazil's abundant hydroelectric
potential. In addition, a shortage of foreign exchange forced the curtailment
of nonurgent imports. By encouraging those most adversely affected by
Brazil's nuclear power program, the US might have increased internal debate.
Instead, US pressure on the Brazilian government provided a rallying point for
Geisel.
Carter's human rights campaign appears to have had the same result as his
stance against nuclear proliferation. As was noted in the previous chapter,
the basis for this policy actually originated in Congress. However, it was
President Carter that took the lead in implementing this policy. Once again,
efforts were concentrated on a government to government basis. That is,
pressure applied on the Brazilian government to liberalize politically far
exceeded any attempts by the United States to encourage democratization by
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supporting institutions within that country. Much of this was obviously due
to a reluctance to interfere in the affairs of a sovereign state. It does,
however, highlight the limits of US involvement in the democratic transition
in Brazil.
When the State Department issued its annual report on human rights
conditions in 1977 in all countries receiving US military assistance, as
mandated under the Harkin Amendments, Brazil was on the list. Many of the
charges were the result of earlier investigations, such as Amnesty
International, but the report nontheless infuriated the Geisel government. In
response, the Brazilian government cancelled a US-Brazil military aid
agreement that had begun in 1952. As US ambassador John Crimins noted, by
September 1977 "all formal structure of military cooperation between the two
countries" had been ended. In rejecting all military aid, the Brazilian
government had effectively eliminated the requirement for any further State
Department reports on human rights in Brazil.
The administration further publicized the human rights issue when First
Lady Rosalyn Carter made an official tour in June 1977. During the trip a
Brazilian student representative gave her a letter that denounced the
government's human rights violations, and on a stop in the Northeastern port
city of Recife, Mrs. Carter met with two US missionaries who had been the
earlier targets of police maltreatment. As a result, the Brazilian government
attempted to show that the US was again trying to influence internal Brazilian
affairs, thereby using nationalism to strengthen its position. The extent of
success of either the Carter administration's attempt to publicize the human
33






rights issue, or the Brazilian government's attempt to gain internal support
by demonstrating its independence, is unclear.
In a visit to Brazil in March 1978, President Carter met with several
members of the opposition. Speaking in terms of the desirability for
international observance of human rights, he avoided outright charges against
the government, which might have been interpreted as interventionism. Instead
of trying to focus on the human rights issue, which had been reduced in
significance because of the Abertura, the remainder of the Carter
administration was spent trying to repair the damage that had occurred as a
result of the nuclear non-proliferation fiasco and the outdated human rights
report. However, the Brazilian government never allowed the relations to
become more than amicable, and later on it refused to back Carter on his
Olympic boycott and grain embargo of the Soviet Union in response to their
invasion of Afghanistan.
The results of President Carter's human rights policy were mixed. On the
one hand, the Brazilian government was clearly perturbed at what it saw as
meddlesome behavior. Foreign Minister Azeredo da Silveira commented that the
worsening of US-Brazilian relations was "the exclusive direct responsibility"
of the Carter administration. Relations between the two countries were
adversely effected, military ties were weakened, support for US policies was
virtually nonexistent, and it can be argued that Carter's policy had very
little effect.
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On the other hand, the damage was not irreparable. By 1979 Vice
President Mondale was able to visit Brazil in a much improved atmosphere. On
talks that included human rights and nuclear energy, one paper noted, "instead
of the aggressiveness of both parties in the past, the talks were more mature
this time." Also at the meeting, President Joao Baptista Figueredo issued a
promise to transform Brazil into "a full democracy in which the human rights
of every citizen will be fully guaranteed." In regards to the abrogation of
the military agreements, it is something the Brazilian government may have
wanted to do anyways, and it should be noted that there was no further
retaliation beyond that point. Neither is it clear that Carter could have
gained support for his policies to protest the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
Brazil had already reasserted its independence in foreign policy under Costa e
Silva, and the government stood to gain financially from increased sales to
the Soviet Union.
Members within the Carter administration saw their human rights policy as
an overall success. As administration official Warren Christopher noted in
1979,
Moreover, there are tangible human rights progress. We do not
claim credit for particular improvements. But we believe that we have
contributed to an atmosphere that makes progress more likely to occur.
In the past year, significant steps toward the transfer of power
from the military to civilian democratic institutions were taken
in. . .Brazil. . .and. .. in Brazil. . .more freedom was extended to the
press, to labor organizations and to political parties.
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Moreover, members within the opposition parties offered their support for this
policy. Worker's Party Deputy Airton Soares and the Brazilian Democratic
Movement Party leader, Deputy Freitas Nobre, wholeheartedly endorsed the
Carter approach." Futhermore, US diplomats reported conversations with
Brazilians who expressed gratitude for US support for human rights, and
individuals who had worked for a democratic Brazil thought US pressure had
been helpful in moderating official policy and pushing toward political
liberalization.
It is not insignificant that Carter was publicly cheered when he spoke of
human rights while in Brazil. Yet, it is also important to remember that
unlike the cases of Argentina, Chile, and several other countries, the United
States did not propose any economic sanctions against Brazil. The pressure
was limited to public criticism of the regime. It was, in effect, a policy
between sanctions and silence. President Carter's human rights policy was,
therefore, only moderately applied, primarily because the human rights abuses
in Brazil had significantly declined. This leads one to believe that
pressure, when applied judiciously, may have a positive impact on the
transition towards democracy in a country with which the US has significant
interests in maintaining good relations, but relatively little influence in
that country.
D. PRESIDENT REAGAN AND THE RETURN TO THE STATUS QUO
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When President Reagan came to power he returned, for the most part, to
the subtle approach pursued by previous administrations. Testimony from
General Alexander Haig during his Senate Confirmation Hearings, noting that
Carter's policies (especially concerning nuclear proliferation) were "fraught
with good intentions but lacking in realism", was received positively in
Brazil. The implementation of realpolitik, within a framework combining
respect for human rights and the use of force, was seen in Brazil as being
compatible with international behavior at the time.
The Reagan administration did not abandon the idea of encouraging the
transition towards democracy in Brazil, but its emphasis, according to
Langhorne Motley, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs,
switched from stressing human rights to providing the infrastructure to
support it. This policy was supported by the "Report of the Western
Hemisphere Commission on Public Policy Implications of Foreign Debt", which
stated,
...Within reasonable limits, democracy in Latin America requires
economic reform in order to survive ... Three elements are crucial to
insuring that democratic governments in Latin America withstand the
present economic crisis and achieve lasting prosperity. These are:
Orderly resolution of the debt crisis; preservation of an open US
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market; and development of a strong private sector in Latin America.
To pursue this strategy, the Reagan administration sought to increase its
influence in the liberalization of the Brazilian economy by improving
relations between the two nations. Vice President George Bush, on a visit to
Brazil in October 1981, announced that the ban on Brazilian purchase of
enriched uranium would be eased. In addition, contacts between the US and
Brazilian militaries were renewed. In 1982 the US granted Brazil a $1.2
billion short term loan to help Brazil through its debt crisis. During the
course of the Reagan administration the relations continued to be focused on
trade and other economic matters.
This focus on economic matters was largely reflected by the opposition in
Brazil. When President Reagan met with Ulysses Guimaraes, president of the
Brazilian Democratic Movement Party, the main opposition force in Brazil, the
talks centered on recent IMF restrictions and the foreign debt. Support for a
transition to democracy did not seem to be an important issue. This does
not mean that all opposition parties focused exclusively on economic matters.
Leonel Brizola, president of the Democratic Labor Party, was concerned that
the Reagan administration viewed the democratic process as destabilizing, and
was thus abandoning all support for democracy. It is important to note,
however, that Brizola based his assessment from discussions with friends
linked to US university circles, and not from conversations with members of
44
. US, Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Latin
America in the World Economy , 98th Cong., 2nd sess. , 1984, p.
121.
45
. "Politicians, Press Comment on Reagan Visit", PY011112
Paris AFP in Spanish 0209 GMT 1 Dec 82, as translated into
English by FBIS, 1 Dec 82, D3.
79
the US government. Yet, for the most part, economic development seemed to
dominate the agenda.
In retrospect, political liberalization and democratization in Brazil was
largely an internal matter. The military regime, led by Generals Geisel and
Golbery, permitted both to occur as a result of calculations of forces within
the country, and not because of pressure or encouragement from the United
States. Domestic pressure from an indentifiable opposition, which intensified
following the 1982 elections, made the military rethink its position. With
the election of Tancredo Neves to the presidency in January 1985 the first two
stages of the democratic process had virtually been assured. The
consolidation of democracy, however, was far from complete.
E. TOWARDS THE CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY
When Fernando Collor de Mello replaced Jose Sarney in March 1990 as
President of Brazil, democracy had yet to be consolidated. Economic conflict,
especially with regards to Brazil's enormous international debt, continually
plagued that country's leaders. In addition, because President Sarney took
over that country's leadership as a result of Neves' unfortunate death, and
not as the result of an electoral triumph, he was forced to rely on the
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military as a critical part of his power base. Therefore, the relationship
the United States had was not with a democracy per se, but with a country
attempting to complete the final phase of a democratic transition. The
primary role the United States has played in this process was (and is) to help
Brazil work through its predicament on debt and the related inflation.
However, it was (and is) just as concerned with that country's ability to
exert civilian control over the military. It is towards this part of the
democratic transition that this study first turns.
The consolidation of democracy in Brazil is clearly in the best interests
of the United States. In terms of civilian control over the military, this
concerns primarily nuclear proliferation and the spread of ballistic missiles.
As has been noted, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty was a major point of
contention between the United States government and the military regime of
Brazil. Ballistic missiles, however, have also been of primary importance.
On a visit to Brazil, US Secretary of State George Shultz expressed concern
over Brazilian arms sales to the Middle East. In reference to ballistic
missiles, Shultz noted that their proliferation was "harmful to world
49peace.
In 1987 the United States began restricing the export of rocket and
ballistic missile technology to Brazil under the terms of the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR). As some experts suggest, whereas Brazil is
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States on the transfer of such technology in the short term, Brazil is likely
50
to become less vulnerable in the long term. As such, civilian control over
the military in general, and over arms sales in particular, is important to
managing the spread of ballistic missiles. The United States, however, has
played no identifiable role in helping to establish civilian control over the
military.
This part of the consolidation of democracy is being accomplished mostly
by the efforts of President Collor de Mello. He began by cutting the
military's share of the budget from six percent to 2.2 percent, and by
asserting civilian power in areas traditionally regarded as military
preserves. Although these cuts have resulted in spreading discontent among
the military, they are not expected to threaten Collor de Mello 's ultimate
goal of exercising civilian control over the military. The other part of
democratic consolidation, that is, the ability of the system to manage
economic conflict (see introduction), is addressed below.
The economy that President Sarney inherited from Brazil's military regime
was, to put it simply, a mess. Under such circumstances, the management of
economic conflict is most problematic. Although external factors (including a
worldwide recession, a depression in commodity prices, higher world interest
rates, and restrictions in credit) contributed significantly to the crisis,
. Scott D. Tollefson, Brazilian Arms Sales. Ballistic
Missiles, and Foreign Policy: The Search for Autonomy . PhD
Dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, the Paul H. Nitze School
of Advanced International Studies, Washington, DC, 1991.
. James Brooke, "Brazil's President Makes the Military Toe
the Line", New York Times . September 9, 1990.
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the heart of the problem was (and is) an extremely inefficient and corrupt
public sector. Accounting for 40-50 percent of GNP, it pervades the entire
system. Vested interest groups have made cutting it virtually impossible.
Thus, unlike the political situation, where the military regime was under
internal pressure to permit liberalization and democratization, pressure for
economic liberalization has come almost completely from the international
environment, and especially from the United States, as it has a major voice in
the IMF.
The link between economic liberalization and the ability of the system to
manage economic conflict is not clear. In many ways, economic liberalization
could actually exacerbate economic conflict as protected sectors are forced to
adapt, making the consolidation of democracy in the short run more difficult,
not less. In the long term, however, economic liberalization is most likely
to produce the greatest degree of economic expansion, and this could alleviate
many of the current pressures experienced by the Brazilian government. In
addition, influencing changes in economic policy that are unpopular with the
public may be more difficult than assisting political changes that promote a
transition to democracy. As such, economic liberalization is an indirect, yet
important, link. With these thoughts in mind, the remainder of this section
deals with the role the United States has played in attempting to influence
that liberalization, and to gain some sense of the ability of international
actors to influence changes within Brazil.
Debt has been the primary leverage that external actors have had on the
. Eliana Cardoso and Rudiger Dornbusch, "Brazilian Debt
a Requiem for Muddling Through", Debt, Adjustment and Recovery
ed. Sebastian Edwards and Felipe Larrain (Cambridge, Mass.:
Basil Blackwell Inc., 1989), pp. 300-307.
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government of Brazil (and perhaps vice versa). In order to ease its credit
problems, that government has had to turn to the international community for
assistance. Yet, as the following analysis suggests, that leverage has not
been as successful as one might wish. The Brazilian government resisted
pressures from the International Monetary Fund to reduce the size of the
government deficit and to reduce the subsidies to state-owned enterprises.
Brazilian Planning Minister Joao Sayad said in December 1985 that "Brazil
cannot continue negotiating with the IMF because Brazil is not willing to
apply recessionary formulas." In reference to the Baker Plan, which
provided new loans to debtor countries that would initiate fundamental
economic reforms, Sayad added that businessmen "will not accept the Baker plan
because it would bring recession and our industry is not willing to bear any
further reduction of activities such as that experienced between 1980 and
1982." By the same token, Brazilians appreciated the willingness of the
Reagan administration to discuss alternative solutions.
That Brazilians viewed United States' assistance as important is without
question. Former Finance Minister Luis Carlos Bresser Pereira believed that
support from then US Secretary of the Treasury, James Baker, was more
54
. "US Should Find Political Solution to Debt", PY060157
Sao Paulo Estado de Sao Paulo in Portuguese 4 Dec 85 p. 26, as




. "Government Reacts Favorably to Reagan Idea on Debt",
PY051646 Sao Paulo Radio Bandeirantes in Portuguese 1600 GMT 5
Aug 87, as translated into English by FBIS, 6 Aug 87, Ml.
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important than that of the IMF." And when President Reagan praised some
Latin American countries for their anti-inflation economic policies during his
inaugural speech at the IMF in October 1986, while failing to mention Brazil,
the Brazilian government took notice, and it was widely interpreted by the
that country's media as a warning to that nation's policy makers. Thus,
foreign countries are indeed sensitive to what is said, or in this case not
said, by important officials of the United States government.
Brazil's leaders clearly understand the need to resolve that country's
major economic problems. In a conversation with Secretary of State Shultz,
Sarney emphasized that
Latin America is going through a process marked by a decline of
expectations and of impoverishment as compared to the more dynamic
parts of the world. .. (this could even) jeopardize the democratization
process taking place on the continent.
With regards to inflation, Sarney warned fellow Brazilians that it was a
serious threat to the consolidation of democracy:
...the vitality and strength of a dynamic economy, with a high
employment level, a great harvest, a high level of exports, good
economic indicators, and a destructive, persistent, and perverse
inflation creates pessimism, corrodes the morale of the country,
unleashes uncontrollable speculation, generates instability and
distrust, and what is worse, threatens all our institutional
achievements.
The high inflation rate, which is higher than ever before, could
lead to the destruction of democracy and freedom and could prevent the
57
. "Bresser Stresses Political Support for Plan", PY240332
Rio de Janeiro Rede Globo Television in Portuguese 2255 GMT 23
Jul 87, as translated into English by FBIS, 24 Jul 87, M2
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. "Government Annoyed over Reagan's Ommission" , PY021501
Madrid EFE in Spanish 1429 GMT 2 Oct 86, as translated into
English by FBIS, 3 Oct 86. Dl.
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translated into English by FBIS, 8 Aug 99, p. 32.
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consolidation of a pluralistic, open, and free society.
In other words, the Brazilians knew the extent of the problem. They also knew
that something was going to have to be done to resolve it.
The government of Brazil viewed reducing its debt and increasing its
trade as the key to improving the situation. Itamaraty, the Brazilian foreign
service, received President Bush's approval of the Brady Plan, a debt
reduction scheme proposed by US Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady, with
"satisfaction", noting that "it is very good because it is a clear signal that
the most important country in the world is aware of the foreign debt
problem." On the other hand, Itamaraty was extremely critical of the
protectionist sentiment in the United States Congress. Since the United
States buys approximately 27 percent of all Brazilian exports, Brazil relies
heavily on the surplus from that trade to service its debt. Therefore, that
government is very concerned with maintaining access to its North American
markets. As a result, Brazil sees the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) as beneficial, perhaps even necessary, to its survival. However, it
is quite evident that debt reduction and increased trade will not in and of
"Sarney Says Inflation Could Destroy Democracy",
PY0601140189 Brasilia Radio Nacional da Amazonia Network in
Portuguese 0900 GMT 6 Jan 89, as translated into English by FBIS
9 Jan 89, p. 36.
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into English by FBIS, 20 Mar 89. p. 53.
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themselves solve Brazil's economic woes. Structural reforms are needed, as
well.
The Sarney government was incapable of resolving its underlying problem.
Collor de Mello thus inherited an economic crisis, including an inflation rate
of 84 percent in March 1990 alone, the month of his inauguration. The debt
problem was just as serious. In July 1989 Brazil was no longer able to fully
service its foreign debt, so by the fall of 1990 it had grown to $115 billion.
In April 1991 it reached $123 billion. The problem appears endemic. Promises
by Collor de Mello to begin privatization within his first three months in
office have yet to be fulfilled. In addition, the radical measures that he
pushed through to deal with these problems may not last. Opposition to his
austerity program became so widespread by late 1990 that voters elected
opposition candidates in two-thirds of the states. Perhaps even more telling,
the percentage of people who no longer believe that his plan will work jumped
by six times, from a level of seven percent in March 1990 to 41 percent in
November of that year.
The United States has continued to be a principal player in attempting to
encourage reforms that would have a lasting impact. In November 1990 Brazil
was granted $250 million in loans from the the Inter-American Development Bank
(IADB), but that was only after the United States warned Brazilian officials
that the country's growing arrears on debt to foreign banks and governments
were getting out of control. 64 In April 1991 that warning became a reality
63
. James Brooke, "Economy of Brazil Still Ails", New York
Times , December 3, 1990.
64
. Stephen Fidler, "Brazil Wins $250 M in IADB Loans",
Financial Times of London, November 30, 1990.
when the United States blocked a $350 million loan for sanitation programs in
Brazil until that government chose to repay interest on its debt. The
pressure, however, is not so much designed to collect interest on the debt as
it is to force Brazil to implement serious economic reforms, especially as it
concerns privatizations and trade liberalization. In short, the United
States, and with it the IMF, are attempting to use their leverage over Brazil
as a means to force that country's government to implement policies that it is
unable, or unwilling, to undertake of its own accord.
The events above might serve to indicate the amount of influence
international factors have on political decision making in Brazil. In the
present situation one finds the government of Brazil in a serious financial
situation. If it defaults on its loans it will be unable to rely on further
credit, something that could severely restrict Brazil's future economic
growth. The government recognizes the extent of the problem and would like to
resolve it, but because of internal opposition it has found it difficult to
undertake the necessary reforms. On the other side is the international
community: That is, the IMF in general, and the US in particular. Both are
genuinely united in their desire to see Brazil succeed in its endeavors, and
most importantly, there is general agreement as to what needs to be done,
namely a reduction in Brazil's public sector and the overall liberalization of
the economy. The IMF and the United States are in a unique position to demand
reforms. They have the ability to reward those reforms, and Brazil clearly
recognizes that its best interests would be served by working with these
actors. As such, Brazilian officials have been willing to negotiate with the
65
. "Latin American Debt: Catching Up", The Economist .
April 13, 1991. pp. 77-78.
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IMF and the United States on those issues. Such circumstances appear to be
ideal for the success of an influence attempt. 130
The reality of the situation, however, indicates the limits of such
influence. Even under ideal conditions the international community has been
unable to force fundamental economic reforms against Brazil's will. Since
1985, the IMF and the US have continued to pressure Brazil to make substantive
changes, yet that pressure has had limited impact. While debt and inflation
continue to rage, politics as usual persist. As one editorial remarked,
(such) has been the recent history of Brazil: promises of change,
rewarded by reschedulings and lower interest rates, but always reneged
upon as governments bought off their friends in the civil service and
business with higher public spending and trade protection.
This is not to say that external pressure cannot succeed in changing internal
policies, or that they are not important. Indeed, the IMF and the United
States have played very important roles in this process. Rather, it indicates
that Brazil will need to be virtually on the brink of collapse before such
pressures will be sufficient to induce internal forces to mend their ways.
Under more normal circumstances international factors would, therefore, affect
the politics of Brazil only at the margins. Yet, as stated earlier, the link
between economic liberalization and the management of economic conflict is
indirect. Therefore, the actual impact that the United States can have on the
consolidation of democracy in Brazil is difficult to assess.
F. CONCLUSION
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Should the United States desire to influence a transition to democracy in
a country where US interests are important, but where the ability to influence
the course of events is severly constrained, it must be done deliberately,
patiently, and with the utmost care. Pressure that exceeds a certain level
tends to be counterproductive, causing a nationalistic backlash that can
easily disrupt relations, and producing unintended internal support for the
government concerned.
United States policy should avoid the economic sanctions route, as large
economies tend to have multiple alternatives. In addition, if contractions in
the economy are effective in forcing liberalization, it is the incoming
democratic regime that is forced to deal with the problem, not an enviable
position to be in. Futhermore, excessive pressure on the system is just as
likely to bring repression, as the government in question forces its policies
to deal with the new constraints.
In certain situations, however, some pressure can be beneficial. At
times, open criticism of the regime, provided it is used judiciously, can have
a positive impact. Moderate pressure makes known the United States' position,
without "demanding" a policy change. It also has the benefit of letting the
opposition know that they are not forgotten. In addition, overt pressure may
be encouraged by forces outside the administration, such as Congress or
private groups, but their influence should be primarily restricted to moral
support. US pressure can also be applied diplomatically. By meeting with the
opposition in private, and by having serious discussions with the persons in
power behind the scenes, US policy can be made clear without driving a wedge
in the countries' relations.
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As in the case study of Chile, the overriding factors in the democratic
transition in Brazil were domestic in origin. Involvement by the United
States was greatest in both the liberalization and consolidation phases of
that transition, but even here the influence was limited. And concerning the
impact of external influences on democratization, the impact was minimal,
indeed. As such, US involvement exceeded its ability to affect the nature of
the transition. This involvement did, however, impact other areas of US-
Brazil relations in important ways. Put simply, the impact on relations is
considerably greater than the impact on a democratic transition. Thus, it is
the limits of US influence combined with the importance of US-Brazil relations
that weigh most heavily on these policy prescriptions.
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V. EL SALVADOR
"Thus says the Lord:
'Those who are for pestilence, to pestilence,
and those who are for the sword, to the sword;
those who are for famine, to famine,
and those who are for captivity, to captivity.'"
Jeremiah 15:
The United States had, until recently, been relatively uninterested in
the affairs of El Salvador. El Salvador had not suffered US intervention as
had many of its Central American and Caribbean neighbors. US investment in
the country had not been extensive, and internal developments did not appear
to affect other US security concerns in the region. Not until after World
War II did the United States begin to even consider El Salvador, and this was
strictly within the context of the East-West conflict. As such, a small
amount of US aid was provided to El Salvador as part of the Mutual Security
Act of 1951. 2
. Harold Molineu, US Policy Toward Latin America (Boulder.-
Westview Press, 1986), pp. 48-50. Molineu argues that US
interventions in Central America during the first third of this
century were largely the result of the US military guaranteeing a
free hand for US business interests. Ipso facto there was no
need to use military force to maintain economic leverage in El
Salvador.
-. Agency for International Development, "US Overseas Loans
and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations:
Obligations and Loan Authorizations", July 1, 1945-September 30,
1986(1987) as cited in G. Pope Atkins, Latin America in the
International Political System (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989),
pp. 264-268. Under the Mutual Security Act, from 1953-1961, US
Export-Import loans to El Salvador totalled 3.2 million dollars
and US economic assistance added another 11.1 million dollars.
Both these figures were considerably below the average for funds
received by other Central American nations. Nicaragua,
Guatemala, Honduras, Costa Rica and Panama received an average of
12.2 million in US Export-Import Bank loans and 122.6 million in
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Following the Cuban revolution, an increased emphasis was placed on
promoting stability in the region. Under the Alliance for Progress military
aid and counterinsurgency training were made available (in 1962 the CIA and US
military helped found ANSESAL, the Salvadoran national security agency), as
well as economic assistance to help promote growth. The US role also appears
to have been to encourage changes within the system itself.
In 1961 the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial
Organizations (AFL-CIO) and a group of US business corporations founded the
American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), a US government-
financed group that aimed to encourage the development of non-Communist trade
unions in Latin America. Evidence that the US was involved in strengthening
trade unions in El Salvador can be found in government documents. They also
indicate that the US may have pressured El Salvador to nationalize its central
bank and the Salvadoran Coffee Co. , adopt a system of price controls, exchange
controls, and high tariffs, develop a progressive income tax, install a
US economic assistance during that period. El Salvador received
23.5 million less than the next lowest aid recipient (Honduras),
during that period, again demonstrating the relative lack of
importance the US placed on that country.
3
. Martin Diskin and Kenneth Sharpe, The Impact of US Policy
in El Salvador. 1979-1985 (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1986), p. 10. Though Diskin and Sharpe claim the US role
in El Salvador was only minor until late 1979, they say "its
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"burdensome" extensive social security system, and attempt to coopt communist
intellectuals by allowing them to takeover the university in 1965. In
addition, Ambassador Murat Williams was reportedly deeply involved in the
organization of the Christian Democratic Party.
With the failure of Castro to export his revolution by late 1968, and the
growing evidence that he tacitly accepted the Soviet doctrines of peaceful
coexistence and the evolutionary transition to socialism, the increase in
military governments in Latin America, US involvement in Vietnam, and growing
domestic problems at home, the United States turned its attention away from
supporting democracy in Latin America. Policy towards El Salvador during the
Nixon and Ford administrations was largely one of benign neglect, meaning the
toleration of military regimes.
With Carter, the emphasis on foreign policy switched to human rights.
The ability to influence events within El Salvador, however, was relatively
limited. Although Carter did exert diplomatic and some economic pressure to
encourage the Oscar Romero regime (1977-1979) to end its repression, military
aid had already been suspended under the Ford administration, and the Carter
administration was seen as inconsistent by the Salvadorans. These efforts
. "Government Documents: On US Policy for El Salvador",
Inter-American Economic Affairs
.
Winter 1980, p. 94. Senator
Jesse Helms claims that these efforts adversely affected El
Salvador's economic growth, creating a burden which the
government was unable to meet. This argument is countered by
Diskin and Sharpe, US Policy in El Salvador , op. cit.
, p. 10,
intimating that the oligarchy refused to implement any such
reforms
.
. Atkins, Latin America , op. cit., pp. 126, 311.
7
. Diskin and Sharpe, US Policy in El Salvador , op. cit., p
10.
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would probably have had little importance were it not for an important
external event: The fall of Anastasio Somoza in July 1979. With the
Sandinistas coming to power in neighboring Nicaragua, the Carter
administration sought to avoid a repeat of a revolution that v/as believed to
be caused by repression from above. 3
A. ORIGINS OF THE CONFLICT
For most analysts in the United States, the problems in El Salvador were
seen to have their origins in two interrelated areas: Inequality, and the
lack of inclusion. Therefore, any solution to that country's civil v/ar would
necessitate addressing these concerns.
The roots of El Salvador's problems can be found in the 19th century.
The colonial structure that had been largely left intact until the 1870s v/as
finally challenged by Liberal President Rafael Zaldivar (1876-1885). During
his administration the country expropriated lands belonging to the Church, and
the Indian communities and common lands, which resulted in rapidly expanding
coffee production. It also reduced the number of landowners with regards to
the arable land. Power became concentrated in the hands of a few families
a
. Robert Pastor, Condemned to Repetition (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 32, 217-221, 223-228.
Pastor, who was the Director of Latin American and Caribbean
Affairs on the National Security Council from 1977 to 1981,
details how sensitive the Carter administration was to charges
that the Sandinistas were supplying the Salvadoran rebels. It
sought to address this problem by promising a continuation of ai '.
to the Sandinistas, provided they would guarantee to restrict n
resupply to the rebels, and by pressuring the Salvadoran
government to grant reforms.
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athe rest of the population became peasant tenants.
The landowners combined authoritarianism and paternalism to control the
country. Repressive, and for the most part effective, the ruling oligarchy
began to meet organized resistance and social unrest with the arrival of the
Great Depression of 1930. In response to the unrest, relatively free
elections were held. In January 1931 Arturo Araujo won the presidency. A
landowner dedicated to reform, he began to concern other landowners with his
socialist leanings. Coupled with government inefficiency and a fiscal crisis
that precluded paying the military and civil servants, the results were
predictable. A coup d' etat was led by General Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez
on December 2, 1931. 10
Believing that any chance for reform had passed, the Communists began to
plan for a rebellion in January 1932. The final date was planned for the
22nd. Unfortunately for the rebels, an informer's tip led to the arrest of
the leader of the rebellion, Farabundo Marti, on January 18th at a small farm
near San Salvador. The government found a large quantity of bombs, arms, and
other information concerning the revolt, including leaflets, specific plans,
and a list of names of other people involved. Although Communist Party
leaders had the opportunity to call the whole thing off, they decided to
9
. Hector Perez-Brignoli , A Brief History of Central
America , translated by Ricard Sawrey and Susana Stettri de Sawrey
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), p. 87.
18
. ibid., p. 110.
. Some sources indicate that the Soviets were involved in
trying to stimulate that insurrection. See Atkins, Latin
America , op. cit., p. 304.
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n
proceed with the revolt.
On January 22, 1932, Indian peasants erupted in rebellion primarily in
the western provinces of El Salvador. The government responded with a heavy
hand. Within days the rebellion was crushed. Documents captured by
government soldiers indicated a significant number of people had made cash
contributions to the rebels. The government decided to liquidate any support
for the rebels through terror. The ensuing onslaught, known as the Matanza or
"Massacre", resulted in the death of between 8,000 and 10,000 persons. The
massacre eliminated most of the members of the Communist Party, but it also
served as a monument to military repression.
For the next 12 years El Salvador was ruled by General Martinez. His
support and legitimacy came almost exclusively from the oligarchy, whose
perceived threat of their own interests led them, in effect, to abdicate
control of political power to a virtual military dictatorship. While the
oligarchy continued to pursue economic interests, the military took charge of
maintaining stability and in the process furthered its own institution.
Political power (including personal gain) was thus decided within a set of
12
. Philip Russell, El Salvador in Crisis (Austin, Texas:
Colorado River Press, 1984), p. 36.
13
. ibid., pp. 36 and 37. This low estimate comes from a
study of the Matanza done by Thomas Anderson in 1971. His
figures are based on the amount of ammunition the government had
in store at the time. Other estimates believe the figure to be
around 30,000. One author even claims the number could have been
as high as 50,000. See Liisa North, Bitter Grounds; Roots of
Revolt in El Salvador , 2nd ed. (Westport, Connecticut: Lawrence
Hill and Co. , 1985) , p. 18.
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allegiances to seniority and loyalty to the tanda. The tanda, or graduating
class, became the means for each member of the military to advance. As
Richard Millet notes,
Each class, known as a tanda, strives to protect and advance its
members' fortunes. Success for one member means success for all and
failure for any weakens the entire group. Hence they protect the less
competent, more blatantly dishonest among them, viewing those outside
the tanda system as unfit to judge the officer corps. . .Under this
system, loyalty becomes incestuous, and group advancement, rather than
defense of the national interest, becomes the ultimate goal.
The importance of the Martinez regime was that it established a pattern
of rule through the 1970s. The army, which had been a tool of the oligarchy
until 1932, became the most important political group in the country. Instead
of working for the oligarchy it now worked with it. In order to maintain some
semblance of legitimacy, it continued its predecessors' practice of holding
elections, and as before, there was little doubt that the outcome would
produce a president favorable to those concerned. Through the centralization
of state power it was able to consolidate control in an impressive manner, and
it used this control to suppress dissent against "communist" elements. For
several decades the government was able to maintain control.
Since 1972, however, violence has been endemic. In that year the
government used blatant fraud to deny a victory to a coalition of the
Christian Democrats (PDC), a moderate party headed by the former mayor of San
14
. David Browning, Conflicts in El Salvador . No. 168
(London: The Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1984), pp. 5
and 6 .
15
. Richard Millet, "The Central American Militaries",
Armies & Politics in Latin America ed. Lowenthal and Fitch (New
York; Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1986), p. 209.
16
. Russell, El Salvador in Crisis , op. cit., p. 41.
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Salvador, Jose Napoleon Duarte (the presidential candidate), and the Social
Democratic Party (MNR), headed by Guillermo Ungo (the vice-presidential
candidate). A post-election rebellion was quickly crushed and Duarte and many
of his followers were arrested or exiled.
Another chance for a democratic solution (Richard Millett called it "El
Salvador's last chance for peaceful change") was scotched in 1977 when the
oligarchy joined with the military to use massive fraud in denying the
presidency to a moderate opposition figure. Again there was a protest, and
the government responded by shooting hundreds of demonstrators. In addition
it passed a "Law to Defend and Guarantee Public Order" . This restricted
public meetings, established press censorship (it provided a three-year prison
term for those who published internally or sent abroad any unfavorable news
about the government, the economy or the society)
,
prohibited strikes and
suspended individual rights and normal judicial procedures for anyone
isdisturbing the public order. These events were not lost on the Carter
administration. Nor were figures published as a Congressional Research
Service Issue Brief, stating that the top 10 percent of landowners controlled
78 percent of arable land, while the lowest 10 percent owned only 0.4
17
. Richard L. Millett, "The Politics of Violence: Guatemala
and El Salvador", Current History , February 1981, p. 70.
18
. Millett, "The Politics of Violence", op. cit. p. 71.
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percent.
These types of facts made a convincing case to view inequality and the
refusal of the government to include these seeking a peaceful redress to their
plight as the fundamental causes of the problem in El Salvador. From this
perspective, it is only natural to assume that the administration would
pressure the regime to relax its repression, stress inclusion, introduce land
reform, and improve its redistribution of wealth. However, to see the
problems of El Salvador as solely endogenous, and to believe that they could
be solved by political means alone would be to miss some central issues that
did much to explain the divisive nature of US policy towards El Salvador.
B. CARTER'S RESPONSE
US administration pressure on the Salvadoran government to reduce
repression, as stated earlier, had been applied for some time. However, with
the fall of Somoza it appeared to be intensified. The US ambassador to El
Salvador, Frank J. Devine, began to send interviews he had with opposition
leaders to the various media in the summer of 1979. In official statements he
expressed the Carter administration's desire to press for fair elections in El
Salvador as a first step toward a political solution. In addition, he called
for socioeconomic changes and supportive statements by the Salvadoran
. Mary Jeane Reid Martz, "El Salvador: United States
Interests and Policy Options" (Congressional Research Service
Issue Brief IB80046, 1980), pp. 1-2 as cited in Millett, "The
Politics of Violence", op. cit., p. 71. Complementary figures
were published by Diskin and Sharpe, "US Policy in El Salvador
op. cit., p. 5. They state that in 1971, 1.5 percent of all
farms accounted for 49 percent of all farm land, and 92 percen
of the farms represented only 27 percent of the land.
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government to that effect.
On October 15, 1979, a group of reform minded young Army colonels
overthrew the government of General Romero and installed a mixed civilian-
military junta in its place. With strong backing from the United States the
coalition began to institute reforms. The junta disbanded ORDEN (a
repressive paramilitary group intended to control rural political
organizations), it removed conservative senior officers, it promised to
investigate the disappearances of persons that had occured under Romero's
rule, it nationalized the coffee export trade, and it prepared for land reform
by freezing many of the landholdings. The one thing it would not do, however,
was to turn control of the army and security forces over to the civilians.
For the civilians this was unacceptable, and they resigned in protest on
. "US Ambassador Devine Accused of 'Meddling'", PA011818
Panama City ACAN in Spanish 1530 GMT 31 Aug 79 PA, as translated
into English by FBIS , 4 Sep 79, p. 1.
21
. Millett, "The Politics of Violence", op. cit., p. 71.
The coalition consisted of Social Democrats (including Guillermo
Ungo) and the rector from the Central American University (Roman
Mayorgo), both of whom had close ties to unions and popular
organizations. Conservative business groups were also
represented. Others claim that the coup itself was directly
promoted by the US State Department: "US Accused of Directly
Supporting Junta", PA012257 San Salvador EL INDEPENDIENTE in
Spanish 1 Feb 80 p. 15 PA, as translated into English by FBIS, b
Feb 80, p. 2. This view was echoed by members within the US
Congress opposed to State Department policies. See "Government
Documents: On US Policy for El Salvador", Inter-American
Economic Affairs , Winter 1980, p. 88.
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January 3, 1980. ll
A second junta was quickly formed. With the support of Washington, the
Cabinet was reorganized and members of the Christian Democratic party were
brought into the new government. Using a combination of promises of economic
and military aid and threats of a total cut-off of support if the regime fell,
the Carter administration deterred a coup attempt from the extreme right. It
continued to press the Salvadoran government for reform, which responded by
passing a major agrarian reform law and nationalizing the banks.
Despite these reforms, the new junta was unable to control the right-wing
paramilitary "death squads". Political assassinations were intensified,
including the murder of the Attorney General Mario Zamora, a Christian
Democrat, and Archbishop Romero, an outspoken opponent of repression, in March
1980. The Christian Democratic party was badly split. Several leaders
resigned from the junta and joined the disloyal opposition. In April they
formed the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR). Duarte, who entered the
junta after the desertions of fellow party members, attempted to maintain a
fragile coalition. US economic and military assistance totalling $90 million
was conditioned on the junta's survival, essentially bribing the military and
business groups to cooperate. The result was a facade. As the government
attempted to maintain the appearance of moderation, the country became
22
. Diskin and Sharpe, US Policy in El Salvador , op. cit.,
pp. 11 and 12. Individuals resisting these efforts included the
Defense Minister (Col. Jose Guillermo Garcia); his deputy (Col.
Nicolas Carranza); the heads of the National Guard (Col. Eugenio
Vides Casanova), National Police (Col. Reynaldo Lopez Nuila), and
Treasury Police (Col. Francisco Moran); and the officers in
charge of the intelligence agencies.
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enveloped in civil war.
The Carter administration had attempted to promote a political solution
to the problems in El Salvador. Its aid was aimed at getting those in El
Salvador's government to support administration efforts toward these ends. As
such, it was primarily directed at solving internal problems. Economic aid of
$63 million was focused on creating jobs through public works, feeding the
hungry, and improving health, education, and housing. Military aid was
confined to nonlethal equipment, such as trucks and radios, although training
for selected officials was provided. Not until January 16, 1981, after the
guerrillas had launched their "final offensive" did the administration supply
arms and munitions.
Even after the Carter administration had left office, former officials
continued to stress that a negotiated settlement was possible. In their view,
the problem continued to be an internal matter. They recognized that the
Nicaraguan government was supplying arms to the rebels, but they were
convinced that any "militarization" of the conflict by the United States would
only worsen the situation. They stressed the need to link aid to human
rights, to press for the inclusion of the left through negotiations, to
continue with land reform, and for the United States to come to terms with the
Nicaraguan government. 2 These thoughts were not shared by the new
24
. ibid.
, pp. 72 and 73.
. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, The
Situation in El Salvador . 97th Cong., 1st sess., March 18 and
April 9, 1981, pp. 5 and 6. Testimony provided by Walter J.
Stoessel, Under Secretary of State.
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Little argument could be made against the fact that El Salvador was a
country with great injustices and inequality. But was the situation being put
in the proper perspective? This question was asked by some conservatives, who
believed Ambassador White was distorting events in El Salvador, and that the
Carter administration was only contributing to chaos within the country.
A major point of contention that these conservatives had with
conventional wisdom was that inequality was not the most serious problem.
Their priority was economic growth, and they insisted that Carter
administration efforts to press for land reform, and its support for the
nationalization of banking and exports would only make matters worse.
According to Senator Jesse Helms (Republican-NC) , a major spokesman for
conservatives, such "reform" represented "the substitution of ideology for
economics.
Land reform was a particular miscarriage of justice. As Senator Helms
pointed out, the reform supported by the administration would give each
inhabitant only 3/10ths of an acre, not even enough to provide subsistence.
This was in a country that had already become self sufficient in food
production. In addition, "the disruption of the agricultural pattern would
break the back of the economy in general, destroy the export market, and
. "Government Documents: On US Policy for El Salvador",
op . cit




reduce foreign exchange to negligible amounts."
These arguments were supported in a study done by Claudia Rosett.
According to her the economic reforms backed by the Carter administration
would have crippled the economy even if it had been at peace. The
expropriation of banks and farms created uncertainty over the status of
property rights. As a result, people refused to invest in property that might
be taken away in the future. The compensation the government provided
consisted of worthless bonds in bankrupt industrial concerns, which amounted
to little more than theft by the government. In addition, the government gave
no guarantees that should the former landholders turn the companies around
that the government would not strip them of their proceeds a second time.
What was in effect a competition among the oligarchy became the product of a
government-run coffee monopoly that used exports to subsidize the rest of the
29
economy.
Bank nationalizations and exchange controls further exacerbated the
problem. The nationalization of the banks led the government to earmark
blocks of credit for political projects. Since these were not based on market
forces, bank credit became a bottleneck to economic growth. Furthermore,
28
. ibid.
. Claudia Rosett, "Economic Paralysis in El Salvador: What
the Guerrillas Don't Destroy, Central Planning Does", Policy
Review
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. For the effects on an economy caused by government
intervention in the financial market see Gerald M. Meier, Leading
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exchange rates is provided in Franklin R. Root, International
Trade and Investment , 6th ed. (Cincinnati: South-Western
Publishing Co., 1990), pp. 313-316.
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foreign-exchange controls, designed to keep capital from leaving the country,
prevented many firms from buying much needed imports because of a shortage of
dollars. Central Bank approval was required for any transaction. Again,
priorities tended to emphasize political necessities at the expense of market
forces, thereby causing many factories and companies to wait so long for
exchange that they went out of business. This was in addition to having to
deal with increased government corruption.
If these were the effects of the reform, could they be justified on the
sole basis of reducing inequality? In other words, were conditions so bad
that almost anything was worth trying? The answer to this is that there is
considerable doubt.
Senator Helm's argument was that El Salvador was not any more
economically oppressed than other countries in Latin America. Citing
statistics generated in 1977 by the OAS Economic and Social Council he argued
that the top 5 percent of the population had a far lower percent (24%) of the
national income than did most Latin American nations (32.7% average) and that
the lowest 20 percent received 5.7 percent, considerably higher than the Latin
American average (3.7%). The Gini index coefficient (used to measure the
level of inequality in a particular country) for El Salvador was .50,
classified as "moderate" by the UN. These are in sharp contrast to the land
distribution figures used by the Carter administration to formulate policy."
Senator Helms drew from a World Bank study to show that the urban and
rural population living below the poverty line, while high (20% and 30%
. Rosett, "Economic Paralysis", op. cit., p. 46.
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respectively), was still below the average for the rest of Latin America.
That same study showed a significant increase in income distribution between
1965 and 1977, as well as rapid growth. 33
In addition to these indicators of economic inequality. Senator Helms
pointed to statistics published by the Inter-American Development Bank,
showing that El Salvador spent a greater percentage of government spending on
education (22.4%) and public health (9.6%) than did most of the countries in
Latin America. Its infant mortality rate was very high, but according to the
same report it was no worse than many of the countries in the region. All
of the major points made by Senator Helms are confirmed in other sources,
including the Statistical Abstract of Latin America.
While noting the caveat that almost anything can be done with statistics,
it is difficult to believe that the solutions promoted by the Carter
administration would address the economic issues in El Salvador. United
States' insistence on government control over the economy had undermined a
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American nations, and that the growth the economy experienced in
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deeper than the mere fact of inequality. It certainly existed, but instead of
approaching the problem as a way to reduce poverty, the Carter administration
used the issue of inequality to promote a political agenda. This agenda was
seen as a compromise between the repressive right and the radical left. It
was a negotiated settlement bent on inclusion. Unfortunately, neither side
was interested in compromise, and both sides were willing to take
extraordinary measures to secure their goals.
D. FORCES ON THE LEFT
For the Carter administration the Sandinistas' involvement in the supply
of arms to the Salvadoran rebels seemed to be of secondary importance to that
of addressing El Salvador's internal woes. Most within the administration
were convinced that the arms supply for the final offensive (an effort to
bring a rapid close to the civil war) was a result of Reagan's victory in
November 1980, and not some desire to create a communist revolution throughout
Central America."15 Ambassador White claimed that even though arms did flow
into the country, the people refused to "pick them up" because they were "sick
and tired of violence." Some even argued that there was little evidence
presented by the Reagan administration that outside sources were involved in
38
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A strong case can be made to support these views. Forces of the
opposition repeatedly denied that they were interested in anything other than
the resolution of conflict within their own country, and they continued to
call for a negotiated settlement. There were certainly moderate elements
within the opposition that had few intentions of a revolutionary struggle.
Yet these moderate forces had joined with Communist guerrillas, a fact that
makes the opposing argument equally convincing.
At a secret meeting in Havana in May 1980, Salvadoran guerrillas formed
the supreme executive body of the insurgents, calling it the Unified
Revolutionary Directorate (DRU). Containing three members from each of the
five active armed extremist organizations operating in El Salvador, the DRU
was to act as the military high command for the conduct of guerrilla warfare
and terrorist actions.
Most of the guerrilla organizations had their origins in the Communist
Party of El Salvador. However, its eschewal of violence since the 1930s, in
combination with worsening conditions, led many extremists to form splinter
groups in the 1970s. The largest group was organized by the former Secretary
General of the Communist Party of El Salvador, Salvador Cayetano Carpio. In
1974 he established the Farabundo Marti Popular Liberation Forces (FPL), the
10
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purpose of which was to serve as "the vanguard of the revolution".
Another important group, founded in 1972 by Joaquin Villalobos, was the
People's Revolutionary Army (ERP). Dedicated to a strategy of "peoples'
revolutionary warfare", it emphasized urban terrorism. Both the FPL and ERP
staged violent disturbances following the formation of the civilian-military
government in October 1979.
The Armed Forces of National Resistance (FARN) was formed in 1975 when
two ERP activists, Ernesto Jovel and Ferman Cienfuegos, broke away from the
group when internal dissention led to the assassination of a key leader, Rogue
Dalton. Another small group to be formed in the late 1970s was the
Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers (PRTC), led by Fabio Castillo,
which conducted acts of terrorism to establish its revolutionary credentials.
Finally, in October 1979 the Communist Party formed its own military wing, the
Armed Forces of Liberation (FAL). Together these groups formed the Farabundo
Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) in October 1980 to serve as the
political/military umbrella for all five extremist organizations.
The difficulty for the FDR and its moderate forces, such as Guillermo
Ungo and Ruben Zamora (Mario Zamora's brother, who defected from the Christian
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share a common ideology with the extremists, and it had no control over the
DRU. By joining with the FMLN it became associated with guerrilla violence
and thereby undermined its role in a negotiated settlement.
While some leaders within the FMLN carefully couched their statements to
indicate that the guerrillas had only modest aims, others were much more
candid. One spokesman indicated that,
The heroic Salvadoran people and the FMLN, their revolutionary
vanguard, will never kneel. With the brother peoples of Central
America whose struggles are increasingly more interwoven in a
multifaceted manner and with the inexhaustible world solidarity we
have the capacity to win and we will win... The world is with us.
Imperialism is against the march of history! United to fight until
final victory! Revolution or death, we shall win!
It was this all-or-nothing attitude that worried many conservatives. Combined
with the support the guerrillas were receiving from Nicaragua and Cuba, it
became especially troublesome.
The Reagan administration's refusal to provide proof of a massive flow of
arms to the Salvadoran insurgency gave some credit to the liberals' claim that
the East-West conflict was being blown out of proportion. Yet, the reasons
for doing so were quite valid. It did not make intelligence available
44
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publicly because it feared it would lose access to critical information, not
to mention the fact that it might risk the lives of people who were providing
that information. Nontheless, it was able to make a forceful case by working
through congressional committees, and by outlining the general flow of arms
and detailing the international network that provided aid to the rebels.
Cuban and Nicaraguan support for the Salvadoran rebels was coordinated
within weeks after the fall of Somoza in July 1979. Training camps were
established and the beginning of an arms supply network was laid. The Cubans
would provide coordination, and the Sandinistas would serve as a conduit for
this arms trafficking system that was large in scale and included contributors
from around the world.
The Reagan administration provided a number of examples that illustrated
the flow of arms. Reconnaissance noted a large number of C-47 cargo flights
beginning in the summer of 1980 from the Papalonal airfield in Nicaragua to
locations within El Salvador. Weapons deliveries over land went from
Nicaragua through Honduras, where in January 1981 authorities captured a truck
. "Cuban and Nicaraguan Support for the Salvadoran
Insurgency", Department of State Bulletin . May 1982, pp. 72-76.
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load of weapons consisting of over 100 M-16/AR-15 automatic rifles, fifty 81
mm mortar rounds, 100,000 rounds of 5.56 mm ammunition, machine gun belts,
field packs, and first aid kits. In April 1981 authorities intercepted a
tractor-trailer containing ammunition and propaganda hidden in the sidewalls
of the trailer. During the same time frame a storehouse was found in
Tegucigalpa that contained a false floor and a special basement for storing
weapons. Staging areas for arms shipments to El Salvador were also found to
be operating out of Costa Rica and Guatemala, where authorities in both states
determined that large numbers of weapons originating in Nicaragua had passed
through their countries.
Training was also an important aspect of Cuban and Nicaraguan assistance.
Nicaragua would provide basic training for thousands of guerrillas in military
tactics, weapons, communications, and explosives. For more specialized
training, guerrillas would transit from Nicaragua to Cuba for instruction in
sabotage and demolition efforts. It is estimated that over 900 Salvadorans
were trained in Cuba in 1980.
Rpp^rts of arms shipments came from sources external to the
.administration as well. Investigative reporting, supported by interviews with
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. ibid., p. 73. Weapons captured in Costa Rica included 13
vehicles designed for arms smuggling, 150-175 weapons ranging
from mausers to machine guns, TNT, fragmentation grenades, a
grenade launcher, ammunition, and 500 combat uniforms. In
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guerrillas and their benefactors (Castro, Ortega and others) found that there
was indeed external support for the Salvadoran insurgency. These sources
included the Washington Post , San Diego Union , El Diario de Caracas , the
Toronto Globe and Mail , and the New York Times . Of course, this does not
prove that El Salvador was part of the larger East-West struggle, but it does
lead one to the conclusion that perhaps the Reagan administration was right.
There is every reason to believe that members of the FDR were sincere in
their stated willingness to negotiate. But the crux of the matter was that
they were only one element of the guerrilla forces, and as already pointed
out, they had no control over the wider aims of the DRU. As Ambassador White
pointed out,
Ungo is not a communist. Ungo is a committed Democrat. The same is
true of a large majority of the Frente. The problem is, if history
teaches as anything, it is that when committed Democrats come into
power and behind them are guns wielded by Marxist-Leninist leadership,
then the Democrats don't last very long.'"
For the Reagan administration the issue was clear. In order to stabilize the
situation in Central America the communists had to be defeated. But in order
to defeat the communists, congressional support was required. The solution,
then, was to find a method acceptable to Congress. Emphasizing democracy was
the answer.
E. OUTSIDE EL SALVADOR
As the Salvadoran government had demonstrated throughout its history, it
51
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. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, The Situation in
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was quite willing to use sufficient force to quell the opposition. Since the
military was unlikely to lose its will to govern, the insurgents decided to
concentrate heavily on international support for their cause. The government,
in response, turned to external sources, especially Washington, where in the
end, both decided to concentrate their efforts (although, as we have seen, the
government did so to a greater degree than did the rebels). As one editorial
put it, "everybody runs to Washington. The Revolutionary Democratic Front did
it. Members of the junta do it. Private enterprise does it. The conflict
was no longer an internal matter; it had become international.
From the beginning the insurgents attempted to maintain that the conflict
was strictly an internal matter. Repeated statements attempted to deny any
link to the East-West conflict. Representative of this position was a
statement given in an interview in Geneva by Robert Cuellar, the Executive
Director of the Christian Movement for Justice and Peace:
(Question) You are being accused of receiving arms and aid from Cuba,
Nicaragua, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam. What is your answer to
this?
(Answer) Without being a military expert I can assure you that the
arms available to us and in the hands of the rebels are bought with
funds from societies and movements in solidarity with the rebels in El
Salvador. Many of these societies are in Canada, the United States
and Western Europe. They give us generous contributions for the
purchase of arms from the black market and the international arms
market. The mouthpieces of US sources claim that they have secret
documents proving that the Salvadoran rebels cooperate with
international communism. This is a fabrication by the US CIA and its
propaganda orchestra. There are political advertisements in West
European papers appealing for help and contributions for us. The
majority of the Salvadoran people suffer from hunger and the most
abominable social injustice but this majority is absolutely not
53
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This denial was reiterated by the General command of the FMLN. They stated,
President Reagan has repeatedly lied and tried to include the
matter of US intervention in El Salvador within the East-West
conflict. This is preposterous. It is impossible geographically to
provide sustenance to the FMLN from abroad.
The United States has taken control of both oceans—the Pacific
and Atlantic. It has bases for logistical support from abroad. Our
forces and resources are national in origin and are based on popular
support.
While the guerrillas attempted to achieve victory on the military front, the
political wing of the FMLN/FDR attempted to sway international public opinion
to support their cause, or at least to abandon the Salvadoran government.
They were, in several ways, extremely successful, receiving support from
socialists throughout the world, including such countries as Mexico, France,
Spain, and Germany. However, in the final analysis it was the policy of the
United States that would most influence the outcome.
The effort to gain international support was identified early as an
important goal by the insurgents. The Revolutionary Coordinating Board of the
Masses (CRM), before it was superseded by the DRU in May 1980, cited several
diplomatic aims. Among them, it decided to "ask the democratic and
progressive countries of the world, including the Vatican, to break diplomatic
and other relations with the counterrevolutionary government junta." In
addition, it would "request the US labor unions and popular organizations to
54
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pressure their government in order to stop economic and military aid to the
counterrevolutionary government junta."
Shortly after the FMLN was established as the political-military front
for the guerrillas, this goal was reiterated. Speaking on behalf of the FMLN
and for the FDR, Guillermo Ungo said.
Above all, now that a political-diplomatic commission has been
established by the FDR and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation
Front (FMLN) with full powers to carry out its tasks abroad as part of
the overall national and international struggel to discuss the
formation of the future revolutionary government, we will make every
effort to reach that dialogue with governments and democratic forces.
This diplomatic effort met with considerable success, as several countries
provided political and organizational support.
In January 1981 Socialist International President Willy Brandt and
Secretary General Bernt Carlsson issued a statement calling for "revolutionary
change" in El Salvador, since "all attempts at peaceful political change had
CO
been blocked by violence and fraud." This statement was also endorsed by
the Spanish Socialist Party, the PSOE. Further support for the insurgency was
added in August 1981 when France and Mexico issued a joint declaration
recognizing the FDR-FMLN coalition as "a representative political force ready
to take on the attendant responsibilities and exercise the attendant rights of
56
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governing." 59 On December 16, 1981, the UN General Assembly endorsed a
"negotiated political solution" by a vote of 68 to 22 with 53 abstenstions. 68
Although the international criticism of the government of El Salvador was
certainly useful politically, it also had its limitations. Unless the rebels
could considerably limit economic and military support for the government of
El Salvador, they would find it increasingly difficult to win the war. Such
support was being provided by the Reagan administration, and although it was
under considerable international and domestic pressure to limit support, it
was able to stand firm.
While the insurgency continued its international diplomatic offensive,
the government of El Salvador also sought to gain international legitimacy.
In the so-called Caracas declaration in September 1981, the Salvadorans were
able to obtain support from a number of OAS states in rejecting the Mexican-
French declaration as interventionist. The Salvadoran government continued
to seek international support in other matters, but it also knew that it was
aid from Washington that was vital. As such, it focused primarily on
obtaining aid in the context of the East-West struggle.
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The government of El Salvador has repeatedly viewed the insurgency as a
communist plot, but with the guerrillas' "final offensive" in January 1981 the
issue of military support from the US became vital. As v/e have seen, there
was already considerable evidence of support from the Sandinistas to the
insurgents. Napoleon Duarte, a member of the third coalition junta, attempted
to make the most of those events. He said,
. . . the important thing is tnat this concern shows that the Salvadoran
problem is not a simple national, domestic problem, but rather a
geopolitical problem that is affecting all of Latin America. That is
why we must understand that it is the result of an international
Marxist strategy, of geopolitical action to obtain control of Central
America, and the Caribbean in order to establish a center of
operations for America and the world. .
.
However, to rely on the East-West issue as the sole reason for a continuation
of US aid would not be enough. Congressional opposition to Reagan
administration policy was continually mounting, so another strategy was need.
With assistance of the US administration, the government of El Salvador
attempted to improve its image and increase its legitimacy by holding
elections and supporting (at least verbally) the protection of human rights.
It is towards this strategy that the focus now turns.
F. THE REAGAN APPROACH
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It is most unlikely that the Reagan administration had as its original
aim the development of democracy in Central America. A typical example of
this attitude was expressed by Jeane Kirkpatrick, the first US Ambassador to
the United Nations in the Reagan addministration. The reader will recall from
the chapter on Chile that she espoused a more "realistic approach" to assess
the "impact of various alternatives on the security of the United States and
on the safety and autonomy of the other nations of the hemisphere." Security,
not democracy, was the most important goal.
That the Reagan administration viewed security interests as a top
priority is clearly stated in its desire to defeat the guerrillas
militarily. Implicit in this argument is that a democratic government could
not prosper as long as it was threatened by communist revolutionaries.
Therefore, security was a precondition to democracy. Such a view runs counter
to the liberals' belief that a negotiated settlement was possible without the
defeat of the rebels, and that a negotiated settlement was the best way to
limit further bloodshed. This does not, however, mean that the
administration was not sensitive to public opposition. Hence, a goal of
democracy was seen as the way to gain support for Reagan's policies.
Criticism of Reagan administration policy was early in developing, and it
had the potential of significantly limiting any aid to the Salvadoran
government. By the summer of 1981 Congress was able to pass the International
Security and Development Cooperation Act, thereby restricting aid to El
210.
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Salvador unless it could be certified that its government was making a
concerted effort to comply with human rights. It was obvious to the Reagan
administration that if it was going to get aid to fight the guerrillas, a new
emphasis was going to be required.
One of the first administration officials to state that democracy in El
Salvador was a fundamental goal was Thomas Enders, the Assistant Secretary of
State for Inter-American Affairs. In September 1981, testifying before the
Foreign Affairs Committee he said,
...we have no doubt about the difficulties involved in applying that
(the democratic process) to a country like El Salvador; but I think
there cannot be any other solution to a deeply divided country than
democratic institutions. You cannot lose that from sight. We have to
move toward it.
Thus, there was a broad suggestion that the economic and military aid being
sent to El Salvador would serve some higher purpose.
In January 1982 President Reagan made a much more direct connection
between democracy and aid when he stated in Presidential Determination No. 82-
4 that
...I hereby determine that the Government of El Salvador is committed
to the holding of free elections at an early date and to that end has
demonstrated its good faith efforts to begin discussions with all
major factions in El Salvador which have declared their willingness to
. US Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Presidential Certification on El Salvador . Vol. 1, 97th Cong.,
2nd sess., February 2, 23. 25, and March 2, 1982, and Vol. 2,
June 2, 22; July 29; August 3, 10, and 17, 1982. The incredible
volume of material on this subject is indicative of its sensitive
nature, and the importance it was given by all concerned.
66
. US Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, US
Policy Options in El Salvador , 97th Cong., 1st sess., September
24, November 5, and 19, 1981, p. 23.
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find and implement an equitable political solution to the conflict.
President Reagan was doing what he felt was necessary to gain congressional
approval for his program. This approach brought considerable condemnation
from opposition within Congress, but was still successful in obtaining the
desired aid. 63
The March 1982 elections held in El Salvador gave the Reagan
administration a moral boost. The refusal to negotiate with the guerrillas
prior to the election was based on the belief that such talks would give the
guerrillas a share of power they were unable to secure by fighting, or to win
in an election. The results seemed to vindicate this belief. The Christian
Democrats won 40% of the vote, while two right wing parties, ARENA and the
PCN, won 29% and 19% respectively. Twelve percent of the ballots were
blank. 70
With these elections the Reagan administration was able to refine its
position and strengthen its case. The State Department was assigned the task
of demonstrating the administration's commitment to democracy. In a speech
. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Presidential
Certification on El Salvador , Vol. 1, op. cit., p. 2.
CO
. ibid., p. 20. A letter was signed by 55 members of
Congress that demanded President Reagan withdraw his request.
Nontheless, 370.1 million dollars in Direct Economic Assistance
and 42.2 million dollars in Security Assistance was approved for
FY 1982. For cumulative aid see the appendix.
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. Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs,
Thomas Enders, as quoted in William Henry, "The Perils of
Negotiating", Time . March 15, 1982, p. 23.
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. Diskin and Sharpe, US Policy in El Salvador , op. cit., p.
23. The FDR and FMLN had refused to participate in the elections
for fear of their safety, and because they felt the military
would retain its veto power.
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given about the time of the elections, Secretary of State Alexander Haig
emphasized the goal of "a Central America in which basic political and
economic decisions are made by Central Americans within democratic,
pluralistic political systems."
Secretary of State George Shultz was able to build on the groundwork laid
by Haig. In March 1983 he outlined a six-point strategy aimed at establishing
democracy in El Salvador. It included support for democracy, reform, and the
protection of human rights; support for economic development; support for the
security of the nations of the region; hope in the future (long-term
incentives to spur sustained economic growth would be provided by the
Caribbean Basin Initiative); detering any attempt by the Sandinistas to
promote a "revolution without frontiers"; and the support for peaceful
solutions to the conflict. On the last point the Secretary cited a speech by
Reagan on March 10, 1983, in which the President enunciated his support for
negotiations aimed at "expanding participation in democratic institutions - at
72getting all parties to participate in free, nonviolent elections.""
Support for democracy was echoed at all levels. In August 1983 Langhorne
Motley, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, and Elliot Abrams,
Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, appeared before
congressional committees to repeat and clarify the administration's aim to
establish democracy throughout Central America. They were aided by two
. "Secretary Meets With Central American Foreign
Ministers", Department of State Bulletin . May 1982, p. 71.
72
. George Shultz, "Strengthening Democracy in Central
America", Department of State Bulletin , April 1983, pp. 37-39
Secretary of State Shultz further outlined this strategy in
"Struggle for Democracy in Central America", State Department
Bulletin
. May 1983, pp. 10-12.
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developments in El Salvador: A constitution was being drafted, and elections
were being prepared for the following year. The message was unmistakeable:
If the guerrillas wanted a share of power they were going to have to
participate in elections.
In addition to pressure from Congress, the Reagan administration had to
compete with the Contadora Process, a group of four Latin American presidents
who came together in January 1983 to encourage a negotiated settlement to the
conflict. President Reagan gave his blessing and pledged his support in a
letter to the presidents in July 1983. Again, the President emphasized that
the establishment of democratic institutions was his highest priority, and he
underlined the need to promote long term economic growth in order to
"guarantee the basic needs of their (the Central American) people." He
promised to respect the principle of non-intervention, provided there was a
verifiable withdrawal of all foreign military and security advisers (including
Soviets and Cubans from Nicaragua), and a certifiable freeze on the acquistion
of offensive weapons. He also made it clear the administration would pursue
its own efforts toward a resolution of the conflict.
. Langhorne Motley, "Elections in El Salvador", Department
of State Bulletin . September 1983, pp. 79-82. Also that issue,
"Fourth Certification of Progress for El Salvador", pp. 82-85.
For specific Contadora Group statements, proposals, and
the draft treaty, see Contadora and the Central American Peace
Process; Selected Documents , ed. Bruce M. Bagley, Roberto
Alvarez, and Katherine J. Hagedorn, SAIS Papers in International
Affairs, No. 8 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), pp. 164-217.
75
. "The Contadora Process: President's Letter to the
Presidents of the Contadora Four, July 26, 1983", Department of
State Bulletin
.
September 1983, p. 83. The Contadora Four
Presidents included Ricardo de la Expriella, Panama; Belisario
Betancur, Colombia; Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado, Mexico; and Luis
Herrera Campins, Venezuela.
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Paradoxically, support for Contadora by the Reagan administration was
largely an effort to maintain Washington's control over peace negotiations in
the region. It felt that such efforts to find a negotiated, verifiable and
enforceable peace in Central America was impractical and would be used by the
Sandinistas as a cover to continue their export of revolution. The Reagan
administration, however, also recognized that there was considerable support
in Congress for Contadora and a negotiated settlement, and that continued aid
to the government of El Salvador was dependent upon at least the perception of
the administration's willingness to support such efforts. As such, the
administration's support for Contadora lacked any real conviction.
This lack of conviction by the administration impacted on its ability to
secure aid. In addition, continued human rights abuses by the Salvadoran
military meant that a major effort was required to get a favorable vote on
each request. In the summer of 1983 the administration lobbied to have the
restrictions on certification reduced, arguing that the process overemphasized
78high profile events at the expense of the long term evolutionary process.
It was a valiant effort, but without the support of Democrats in Congress it
was bound to fail. The loss of support for administration policy in the
region meant a new strategy was required. What was needed was a bipartisan
approach. To prevent others from gaining control over policy in the region,
1K Riordan Roett, "Forward", Contadora and the Diplomacy ;t
Peace in Central America , ed. Bruce M. Bagley, SAIS Papers in
Latin American Studies (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), p. x.
11
. Cynthia Arnson, "Contadora and the US Congress",
Contadora and the Diplomacy of Peace , op. cit., pp. 123-141.
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President Reagan decided to form a bipartisan panel to investigate the issue.
The result was the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, known
commonly as the Kissinger Commission.
In July 1983 President Reagan nominated a group of 12 bipartisan and
prestigious individuals, headed by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger,
to examine the conflict within Central America. Over the next six months the
commission selected leading consultants to look at social, economic,
political, security and diplomatic issues, as well as US interests in Central
America. It travelled to eight Central American and Contadora countries,
where it met with both government officials and private citizens. In
addition, the commission heard testimony in Washington from numerous expert
witnesses, as well as from officials from the US Department of State, Defense,
JCS, CIA, NSA, AID and other government agencies. On January 10, 1984, they
delivered the report to President Reagan for his consideration. The report
concluded that Central America was a vital region, and that a sustained US
interest in the area was required. It recognized that the issues involved
were complex, but it also stated that the East-West conflict was the dimension
that gave the civil war in El Salvador its strategic importance. The
significance of the administration's aid request was therefore directed not at
establishing democracy per se, but at using economic development and
institution building as the tool to combat communist expansionism, which when
. Report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central
America . January 1984, p. 2. The Commission included: Henry
Kissinger (Chairman), Nicholas Brady, Henry Cisneros, William
Clements, Jr., Carlos Diaz-Alejandro, Wilson Johnson, Lane
Kirkland, Richard Scammon, John Silber, Potter Stewart, Robert
Strauss, and William Walsh.
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126
defeated would eventually allow democracy to be consolidated.
Among other things, the Kissinger Commission Report emphasized the need
for a significant increase in military aid to the Salvadoran government. 91
Equally important, it rejected the notion that negotiations alone could solve
the conflict. A commitment to free elections within the context of regional
security was deemed to be the key to any successful settlement. Economic and
social development were recognized as essential for the long term (the report
called for large amounts of aid ($8 billion) to stabilize the economy and ease
human suffering), but they could not occur without first establishing
01
security. In essence, it was what the administration had been advocating
for some time.
The Kissinger Commission was a brilliant stroke by the administration.
It could now pursue its agenda, while maintaining the pretense of a bipartisan
policy toward the region. Economic and military aid for El Salvador was now
01
more readily available, and in significantly higher quantities. For the
remainder of the administration it stood as the blueprint for administration
policies. Presidential elections in El Salvador in May 1984, Constituent
Assembly elections in March 1985, and municipal and legislative elections in
March 1988 seemed to vindicate the approach. But just how successful was it?
. ibid., p. 102. The report also highlighted the need to
make the aid contingent upon progress toward free elections, and
the vigorous protection of human rights, including the
prosecution of past offenders, (p. 104).
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G. ANALYSIS OF THE REAGAN APPROACH
Opponents of the Reagan administration continued to criticize its
reluctance to pursue a negotiated settlement. Others, who supported the
Kissinger Commission recommendations, believed that the administration, while
lending rhetorical support, was in reality undermining the process. One thing
was clear: Some alteration of the policy was likely to occur.
Liberals continued to be incensed by administration policy. They
believed that the goal of a defeat of the guerrillas was unrealistic, and that
the United States was therefore largely responsible for the prolongation of a
war that had caused tens of thousands of deaths. As such, it was
fundamentally immoral. Robert Goldman, a professor of law at the American
University noted,
...The Reagan Administration by pursuing its bankrupt policy of
ethical and political realism, has done harm throughout this
hemisphere by consistently seeking military alliances and solutions
rather than supporting democratic forces and nonviolent measures.
It has done harm by debasing and sacrificing the ideals of
democracy for the illusion of order and friendship that a military
regime imposes, no matter how corrupt or obscene that regime. And it
has done harm by squandering the moral currency of human rights by its
rhetoric of convenience.
The argument that the Reagan administration's "rhetoric of convenience" was
immoral presupposes that the administration was concerned with a military
solution only, implying that it was unconcerned with the establishment of
democracy. This is not necessarily true.
. US Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The
Status of Democratic Transitions in Central America . 100th Cong
2nd Sess., June 23 and 28, 1988, p. 31.
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The administration was concerned that a guerrilla victory would lead to
the establishment of a hostile Marxist state. Such a state would hardly be
democratic. As mentioned earlier, while this view cannot be proved to be
correct, there is substantial evidence to support those who believe it to be
correct. As such, their first concern was with the survival of the Salvadoran
government. In order to help the Salvadoran government survive, military
assistance was provided. Herein lies the half truth: The Reagan
administration was indeed prolonging the war. But it was doing so only
because it believed that a victory by the guerrillas provided an unacceptable
alternative.
To view the security of a nation as an administration's top priority is
only common sense. The counter argument to this is that the guerrillas had
been willing to negotiate, and that through negotiations the civil war could
be ended, peace established, and democracy enhanced. The guerrillas have
always been willing to negotiate, but on what terms? They have implied that
they would confiscate the wealth of landowners and distribute it throughout
society. They have maintained the position that they should be given control
over certain sectors of the country. They have repeatedly stated their
confidence of ultimate victory, and they have refused to disassemble their
armed power. It was this threat of continued violence to achieve political
power, and thereby gain control over the economic means of production, that
had so worried the Reagan administration.
85
. "FMLN Document States Policy On Dialogue", PA201416
(Clandestine) Radio Venceremos in Spanish to El Salvador 0034 GMT
20 Nov 85, as translated into English by FBIS, 21 Nov 85. pp. 3,
4, 6, 11 (respectively). Pages 2-18 of this issue contain a
complete listing of FMLN demands for a negotiated settlement.
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The use of "rhetorical convenience" to describe President Reagan's
support for democracy is also somewhat inappropriate. While it may be true
that the administration did not support a democratic transition in and of
itself, a strong case can be made that it truly believed in supporting a
democratic transition as the best means to prevent a communist takeover. It
is a recognized fact that democracy cannot prosper in the midst of anarchy, so
to say that the administration supported "military alliances and solutions" at
the expense of democratic forces seems to miss the issue. Military assistance
was needed if democracy was to have a chance, and the refusal of the
guerrillas to partake in elections (for whatever reasons) provided the
administration with its justification to provide aid. That the administration
used the theme of democracy to procure military assistance in order to
establish the foundation for that system was not "a rhetoric of convenience",
it was a necessity. It was not immoral. It simply went against fundamental
assumptions made by the other side.
Another argument against the administration was that it was undermining
the Duarte government in its attempt at reform. According to some sources the
United States applied pressure against land reform because it feared the right
would defect from the regime. In addition, administration support for
austerity measures placed considerable pressure on Duarte to reduce government
expenditures. Reportedly, it also undermined his regime because the United
States called for privitization of the economy, thereby strengthening the
right. 86
The seriousness of this argument is not so much in a difference of
. Diskin and Sharpe, US Policy in El Salvador , op. cit.,
pp. 36-38.
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opinion over the causes of economic ills, but in the charge that the Reagan
administration was ignoring the recommendations of the Kissinger Commission.
According to this view the Kissinger Commission aimed at not only counter-
insurgency victory but at social and economic reforms. According to Sam
Dillon, "American officals since 1985 have routinely criticized the 1980 land
and banking reforms as economically unsound, even though the commission's
report supported such reforms as necessary moves toward social justice."
Dillon also stated that targets of "human development" and judicial
revitalization were behind schedule.
This argument can be easily justified by reading the Kissinger Commission
report. For example, one recommendation was the requirement that "economic
growth goes forward in tandem with social and political modernization."
Yet, it should be remembered that this was a bipartisan report, containing
something for everyone. It goes on to say that the situation requires that
"the nations of the region pursue appropriate economic policies" and it added,
"we encourage the greatest possible involvement of the private sector in the
stabilization effort." As far as the targets are concerned, the damage the
guerrillas inflicted upon the economy and society cannot be overstated.
Therefore, it could be said that disagreements over the Reagan
administration's compliance with the report were a matter of interpretation.
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While the administration may have been able to support its policies on
matters of principle (this is not to say that they were correct, merely that
they were justifiable), it had a more difficult time arguing that it was a
success. While it must be remembered that the principal aim of the policy was
to prevent a collapse of the Salvadoran government and resultant guerrilla
victory (of which it has been largely successful), the more general aims of
democratic development and economic growth have been elusive.
A report to the Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus outlined many of
the problems with administration funding. Waste and corruption by the
Salvadoran government, resistance of the military and the right to reform, and
tenacity of the rebels' war against the economy meant that a half billion
91dollars a year was required to sustain the stalemate in El Salvador. In
addition, there had been a serious misuse of funds, including the use of US
economic aid for military purposes. Legal and judicial reforms were also at a
standstill. The report therefore recommended a decreased emphasis on military
aid, and a related increase in aid aimed towards reform and development. It
also suggested that aid should be linked to human rights and a negotiated
01
settlement to the war. In essence, the report suggests that Congress is
unwilling to continue to provide substantial funds for a war that the
government in El Salvador has so far been unable or unwilling to win. With no
end in sight, it was suggestive of administration options.
Another problem the administration faced was the conduct of the war
. Sen. Mark Hatfield (R-Ore), Rep. Jim Leach (Rep-Iowa),
and Rep. George Miller (D-Cal), "Bankrolling Failure: United
States Policy in El Salvador and the Urgent Need for Reform",





itself. A study conducted at the Kennedy School of Government by four active
duty US Army Officers was most revealing. Not only did it suggest important
changes had to be made, but it stated clearly that without American support
the government of El Salvador would collapse.' 3 Their study pointed out that
the major problems included: A dearth of study on small wars within US
military schools, a lack of organizational responsibilities and authority for
fighting such wars (both in Washington and in the field), improper security
assistance (unpredictable funding and too little control by the US in how the
money is spent), a lack of a clear vision as to US intentions (including
political support to sustain that vision), inappropriate use of technology,
and the lack of debate over what to do when the US withdraws.
Perhaps the major problem in these efforts by the Reagan administration
to help the Salvadoran government win the war appears to be within the
government of El Salvador itself. In other words, it was not just the
tenacity of the guerrillas that had prolonged the war. As Richard Millett
writes,
...The Reagan administration's priority was defeating the guerrillas.
Restoring domestic order required creating a more effective
military. . .This policy assumed that defeating the guerrillas was the
Salvadoran military's top priority too, and that US aid would increase
military professionalism, which would decrease human rights abuses and
enhance the military's public image. .. (but) the armed forces had their
own agenda. Their top priority was protecting the military
institutions from radical guerrillas, civilian politicians and foreign
reformers. Next was promoting one's own tanda and excluding from the
93
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system those who had not passed through the Escuela Militar.
Therefore, if the Reagan administration's policy was going to be successful,
then a strategy would have to be found to motivate the military to produce
results. Stalemate was unacceptable.
H. THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION
The Bush administration does not appear to be willing to match Reagan's
commitment to defeat the guerrillas at continued high costs. It has been more
willing to compromise on critical issues, especially negotiations concerning
power sharing, but it has done so in the context of allowing Central American
leaders to take the initiative. In this way, the Bush administration has
attempted to lessen its responsibility in the conflict, while appearing to be
vigorous in support of its resolution.
The Bush administration has pledged support for the government of El
Salvador. In a statement following the March 1989 Presidential election the
White House said,
...the guerrillas will not succeed in obtaining the political victory
in the United States that they cannot win among the people of El
Salvador. The United States is committed to the defense of democracy
and human rights in El Salvador.
QC
. Richard Millett, "The Central American Militaries", op.
cit., p. 210. Problems with the Tanda system were also mentioned
in the Kennedy School study (Bacevich, p. 82).
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. Stephen Baker, "For Bush, Central America Won't Be A
Crusade", Business Week , January 16, 1989, p. 50.
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However, the administration has also demonstrated considerable sensitivity to
congressional concerns. J It welcomed statements by President Alfredo
Cristiani concerning his commitment to continue the dialogue with the FMLN
guerrillas, and it highlighted conditions to US aid by stating that "...so
long as El Salvador continues on that path (democracy and human rights), the
United States will remain a firm and steady ally."" While the Bush
administration has warned that aid is contingent on the respect for human
rights, it has also been less inclined to push for reforms.
In one sense, the Bush administration has been walking a fine line
between President Carter's policy on human rights with its emphasis on a
political settlement, and President Reagan's goal of establishing security
first, and then building democracy from that foundation. Like the Carter
administration it seeks a political solution to the crisis. Like the Reagan
administration, it is willing to commit considerable military and economic
aid. Yet, it is unwilling to go as far as either did in their respective
direction. It is playing a tug of war with Congress, while it hopes for the
best. The key issue has therefore become the inability of either the
. On March 24, 1989, President Bush, James Wright (Speaker
of the House), George Mitchell (Senate Majority Leader), Thomas
Foley (House Majority Leader), Robert Dole (Senate Republican
Leader), and Robert Michel (House Republican Leader) signed the
Bipartisan Accord on Central America . This bipartisanship marked
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Salvadoran government or the rebels to win a clear victory.
In many regards, the Salvadoran government's use of elections as the key
to solving its civil war, and the theme of democracy as the underpinning in
its attempt to procure international asistance to fight the guerrillas, has
been relatively successful. From 1982 to 1989 it was able to hold six
national elections, all of which were open to the opposition. In so doing,
it has gone far towards maintaining its legitimacy and improving its stature
in world public opinion. Perhaps even more importantly, that government
received nearly $4.5 billion in US aid since 1980. After being threatened
by defeat at the hands of the insurgents in 1981, the government of El
Salvador has gone far in solidifying its position.
In comparison, the guerrillas have also had important successes. After
it became clear that they could not defeat the government of El Salvador as
long as it received US support, the major concentration of effort was to put
pressure on Congress to cut aid. The insurgent left did continue to receive
support from its counterparts in Western Europe, but it was evident that those
countries would not risk relations with the United States by playing an
Arms Aid", Washington Post . April 27, 1990. For administration
willingness to support negotiations see, Clifford Krauss, "Baker
Presses Lawmakers to Back El Salvador Talks", New York Times ,
April 14, 1990, or "El Salvador: Angry Paymaster", The
Economist ' . May 19, 1990, pp. 50 and 52.
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May 1989, p. 84. The reader should recall
that the stated reasons the guerrillas did not participate in the
elections were that they believed the military would retain its
veto power, they wanted a role in drafting the constitution, and
because they feared for their safety.
103
. Al Kraraen, "Salvadoran President Seeks Continued




opposing role in the area.
The insurgents have advanced a two-pronged approach towards reducing US
aid to El Salvador: It has lobbied interest groups in the United States to
pressure Congress, and it has held out the prospects of a negotiated
settlement in a war that has been a financial burden to the United States.
Both have produced results.
Throughout the 1980s the guerrillas found a sympathetic ear from many
church groups and religious leaders, academics, antiwar activists,
newspersons, womens groups, various unions, and several famous people.
These groups, in turn, have pressed Congress to cut off aid to the Salvadoran
government. Influential members in both houses of Congress have reacted to
such pressure. As a result, the administration has continually had to fight
for each request. Though eventually approved, the aid came with numerous
104 Mujal-Leon, European Socialism and the Conflict in
Central America , op. cit., pp. 38, 39, 56, 59, 85, 98.
. An example of interest groups and responsive
legislators can be seen in "US Groups Show Solidarity with
Guerrillas", PA131334 (Clandestine) Radio Venceremos in Spanish
to El Salvador 000 GMT 13 Jun 81, as translated into English by
FBIS, 16 Jun 81, p. 6.
. For example, prior to a Senate vote to cut off aid to
El Salvador in October 1990, groups such as the Committee in
Solidarity with the People of El Salvador spent $30,000 on a
television ad campaign in swing senators' states. See,
Christopher Marquis, "Salvador Aid Opponents Plan Graphic Ad
Drive", Miami Herald , September 20, 1990.
^. Even after Bush supported negotiations with the
guerrillas as a way to bring peace to El Salvador, something
Reagan refused to do, the administration has still had difficulty
in obtaining sufficient aid. See, Al Kamen, "Committee votes 50%
Cut in El Salvador Arms Aid: Lawmakers Seeking Change in US
Policy", op. cit.
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restrictions that have often handicapped the war effort. w
Another tactic the guerrillas have used was to make support for the
government of El Salvador so expensive that a negotiated settlement appears to
be an easy way out of the quagmire. In the mid-1980s the guerrillas switched
their strategy to include the destruction of economic infrastructure targets.
Rebel attacks on the economy have caused in excess of $300 million a year in
economic losses. As such, it has been difficult for the US aid effort to
keep the economy from deteriorating. In FY 1987 an historical first occured:
US funding surpassed El Salvador's contribution to its own overall budget.
The question that has been constantly asked is if the effort is worth it.
Just as the Salvadoran government has been able to survive the onslaught
of the guerrillas, so have the Salvadoran insurgents persevered against the
military's attempt to defeat them. The situation within El Salvador has,
therefore, changed little. In contrast, the situation outside that country
has changed considerably. As was indicated in the earlier chapter on Soviet
foreign policy changes, the new international environment means that the
United States no longer needs to view events within El Salvador in terms of
the East-West conflict. Yet, as that chapter also indicated, those changes do
not necessarily mean that the government of El Salvador can be abandoned
without due concern. With neither side able to win a clear victory,
negotiations appear an attractive alternative to conflict. They should not,
however, be the pursuit of negotiations at any cost.
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The Bush administration has had to face this dilemma head-on. In
November 1989 six Jesuit priests were murdered, and most indications are that
the deed was carried out by Salvadoran military personnel. Congress was
infuriated. Despite heavy lobbying by the administration, both houses of
Congress voted in 1990 to withhold approximately half of the $85 million in
military assistance ear-marked for El Salvador in FY 1991. 1U Aid was to be
restored if the FMLN was to launch another military offensive, or if it
rejected UN mediation efforts. On the other hand, it would be cut off
completely if the government of President Cristiani either refused to accept
the UN plan or failed to prosecute military officers believed responsible for
the slaying of the priests. Given that no Salvadoran officer had ever been
convicted of a human rights abuse, the odds were good that aid would be cut
off. 112
Within five weeks of the Senate vote, the Salvadoran rebels launched a
series of attacks that claimed at least 220 lives and left about 400 people
wounded, the most in one month since the November 1989 offensive. In
addition, they shot down a government jet fighter and a C-47 gunship with
surface-to-air missiles. Noted one European diplomat with close ties to the
FMLN, "the only explanation I can think of is that radical elements can't
bring themselves to accept any agreement not entirely on their own terms, even
though (Alvaro) de Soto (the UN mediator) has given them much of what they
1U
. Michael Ross, "Senate Votes 74-25 to Cut El Salvador
Arms Aid in Half", Los Angeles Times . October 20, 1990.
112
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York Times . July 27, 1990.
113
. Kenneth Freed, "Salvador Rebels Lose Support in Latest
Offensive", Los Angeles Times , December 7, 1990.
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want." 114 On January 15, 1991, two American airmen in a US helicopter were
murdered after they had been shot down by guerrillas, and this resulted in a
resumption of US military aid by administrative order. It turned out that the
missiles the rebels had been using to shoot down those aircraft had been
recently purchased from Nicaraguan army officers in defiance of a ban by that
115government.
However, all hope is not lost. The series of negotiations that began
under UN auspices in July 1990, continue to be held in Mexico. And although
past human rights abuses remain a major obstacle, substantial accord has been
reached on electoral and judicial reform. In addition, an appeals court
ruled that the case against the nine soldiers accused of murdering the six
Jesuit priests can go to trial, something unthinkable not so long ago.
Another positive sign that a negotiated settlement is possible was the
Salvadoran rebel leaders' order to end election interference in the March 1991
elections, the first time that had occured in the history of the decade-old
guerrilla coalition. Caution, however, is prudent.
The guerrillas have always been willing to negotiate. Yet, it is
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that the US end all military and economic aid to the Salvadoran government.
More recent demands include the expulsion of more than 200 military officers
and a total restructuring of the armed forces. Although these demands
deserve serious discussion, they should not be preconditions to a cease fire.
Negotiations must not become a siren call. One should recall the words of
President Cristiani:
Cutting aid (to the Salvadoran government) will not end the war
quickly; in fact, it may prolong it. The FMLN guerrillas are looking
for a signal that the US will abandon its earlier resolve, thus giving
them grounds to continue the pursuit of their objectives by force.
I have made it abundantly clear that military reform, including a
major reduction in the size of our armed forces, is a priority for my
government. But while more than two-thirds of our soldiers are simply
standing guard over our electrical power system and economic
infrastructure, it is absurd for us to dismantle our defenses
unilaterally before a cease-fire agreement.
Instead, I urge the continuation of full US military assistance
to El Salvador until the FMLN agrees to a cease-fire. When this is
achieved, I am prepared to decline half of all available US military
aid. Our goal remains to free our people from the constant fear of
attack and to incorporate the FMLN into the democratic process.
I . CONCLUSION
Although the primary purpose of this case study is to examine what role
the United States can play in influencing a democratic transition in countries
with which it has considerable influence, it would be inappropriate to exclude
the role that the United States has played in El Salvador's civil war. While
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the other two case studies focused on American foreign policy with regards to
military regimes, neither had to endure a conflict of this nature. This
conclusion is, therefore, concerned with El Salvador's democratic transition,
and its civil war.
This study shows that US foreign policy can be effective when it is
unified on fundamental issues. The Carter administration was successful in
pressuring the right to reduce human rights abuses, and the Reagan
administration was successful on those occasions in which it defined support
for democracy as the best way to achieve its aims. It also shows that when US
foreign policy is divided, it can be not only ineffective, but damaging as
well. The Carter administration's emphasis on land reform was never properly
implemented, and was probably counterproductive anyway, and the Reagan
administration's willingness to walk a fine line on security assistance led to
increasing resistance by Congress to fund the war, which jeopardized future
aid.
Aid should therefore be linked to fundamental concepts agreed to by both
the administrative and legislative branches. Issues such as human rights and
free elections are the two most important. General funds that are used to
pressure the Salvadoran government towards reform in controversial areas, such
as land reform, should be avoided. A clear statement of purpose is needed-
-
one that has overwhelming bipartisan support. If such a policy cannot be
found, then the US is likely to continue to muddle through.
Generalizations about the impact of United States policy on democratic
transitions in countries with which it has considerable influence are more
problematic. As this case study suggests, the primary concern of US foreign
policy with regards to El Salvador was the civil war. To examine that policy
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in terms of a democratic transition is, therefore, somewhat misleading. An
attempt, however, will be made.
The most basic conclusion of this study is that in order for a democratic
transition to be completed, civil war must first be ended. Not only is
consolidation impossible, but liberalization and democratization are in
jeopardy, as well. Efforts are so focused on establishing control over the
situation that basic human rights cannot be guaranteed, and the development of
democratic institutions and the corresponding representative relations suffer
accordingly.
As opposed to the previous case studies, the United States was actually
quite involved with both the liberalization and the democratization processes.
Pressure has been continually exerted over the government of El Salvador to
respect human rights, and considerable effort has been put into strengthening
existing institutions. In addition, it is difficult to imagine that regularly
scheduled, open elections would have taken place without US assistance.
However, as in the previous case studies, the limits of actual US
influence are evident. Although human rights abuses are no longer on the
scale that existed in the early 1980s, they still persist. US control over
the military, especially as it concerns the tanda, is particularly weak.
Considerable pressure is needed on a continual basis in order to have any
noticeable impact. Yet, a total cut off in aid would only make matters worse.
If the military were to believe that it no longer had anything to lose, than
it is quite possible that a return to the horrendous repression of the past
would occur. And while considerable efforts have been made to improve the
judicial system, these, too, have proven inadequate.
The fault of these efforts lies, not so much with US policy, but with the
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situation in El Salvador itself. In other words, it is forces within El
Salvador that will ultimately determine whether democracy will succeed. This
is not to say that mistakes in US foreign policy have not been made, or that
problems no longer exist. On the contrary, US foreign policy in regards to
this situation requires constant correction, and it is rare that it hits its
intended mark. However, it must be remembered that the current situation is
not a result of US involvement, but of Salvadoran intransigence. It is, after
all, their war.
The conflict in El Salvador is an ongoing affair that has claimed the
lives of some 72,000 people in just over a decade. As this study has shown,
both sides in the conflict share responsibility. It has caused billions of
dollars in economic damage, further exacerbating a situation that has caused
considerable hardship for the people least able to afford it; the poor.
No easy solution exists for the conflict. It has its origins in
centuries of history, and the problems cannot be solved in a single
generation. While the opposition continues to berate the inequality within
society and repeat the need for reform, the central issue in this debate is
neither. It concerns the basics of power sharing, or in this case, the
inability to share. The rebels want some power before a constitution is
drafted. The government says that one is already in place, and that if the
insurgents want a share of power then they will have to lay down their arms
and join the democratic process.
In the center of this mess is the United States. It has attempted
desperately to build an infrastructure with which the government of El
Salvador can govern its people. Yet, forces on the extreme left and right
continue to sabotage those efforts. On the one hand, the United States should
14 4
press for negotiations, because only through compromise can a true democratic
transition occur. On the other hand, negotiations at any price would only
show that the protracted use of terror is an effective way to gain power that
cannot be secured by legal means.
The Bush administration appears to be taking this middle road. In
conjunction with Congress, it has pressed for negotiations, while continuing
its support for the government of El Salvador. Yet, if it is forced to
abandon this path, for whatever reason, it will be the people of El Salvador,
not the United States, who will suffer in the end. With the changing
international situation, further involvement in El Salvador is, therefore,
increasingly more of a moral issue than one of security. Since support for El
Salvador is no longer determined by the context of the East-West conflict, the
issue must focus on reducing the amount of suffering in a neighbor to the
south. However, those within El Salvador must take responsibility for their
plight.
As for the current conflict, it is unclear exactly what the guerrillas
would do if they ever achieved power. They could develop a totalitarian or an
authoritarian state, or they might provide for a democratic government. This,
however, is not the issue that should be emphasized. In this context, the
importance is stressed on how they come to power. As long as the guerrillas
refuse to participate in elections, and continue to use violence to gain a
share of power, they should be treated as guerrillas.
If one were looking for a recommendation concerning the situation in El
Salvador it would be to continue to aid the government of El Salvador against
the insurgents and to support elections as the best way to solve that
country's problems. Aid should be provided to whatever party wins the
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elections (provided they are conducted fairly under the circumstances), in the
hopes of building a more secure, more democratic government. Pressure can and
should be applied to hold officials responsible for their actions, but the
success of that pressure is likely to be limited. As a result, expectations
should be low. One senator appears to have said it best,
...El Salvador needs less politicization, not more. The terror needs
to be put down, and the economic situation stabilized. Our policy
should be to support depoliticization and security, so that working
people and farmers can go about their lives and jobs in peace. Until
the fundamental human rights are restored, it is a misplaced priority
to expect a full-blown democracy to re-emerge. Our policy should be
to support neither the left nor the right nor the center, but to go
beyond politics to the basic issue of freedom.
The United States can support a democratic transition in countries with which
it has considerable influence, but as in the other case studies, it is sever ly
restricted by the nature of domestic politics within that country. In the
case of El Salvador, support should be limited to what is necessary to prevent
the insurgents from seizing power by undemocratic means. The rest is
ultimately up to the people of El Salvador.
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V I . CONCLUSIO N
"I once was told,
'If you say "free the slaves",




is its own best vehicle."
Benjamin S. Pitkin
Several forces influence democratic transitions in developing countries.
They include historical, cultural, social, economic, political, and
international factors. Of these, the least explored is the role that
international actors have on those transitions. The purpose of this study was
to examine what role those actors can have, in particular the United States,
and to prescribe certain policies for use in assisting such developments.
Generalizations are, of course, difficult. It is impossible to know if
the lessons learned from each of these case studies would apply to other
countries. El Salvador is certainly a unique case, and whereas the economic
situation may dominate US policy concerns in one country, such as Brazil,
political factors may be the most important in another, such as Chile. Thus,
different variables make specific policy recommendations of little practical
use. There are, however, some broad observations that can be made, and it is
with these thoughts that this study now concludes.
To begin with, the aims of any given policy do not necessarily produce
the desired results. As such, policy will necessarily undergo constant
corrections. Part of this is due, no doubt, to the special circumstances of
each situation. However, it also demonstrates the nature of the US political
system. When any given foreign policy was pursued to its logical extreme,
147
either in terms of a high moral purpose (as it did in some ways in the Carter
administration) or realpolitik (as it did in some ways in the Reagan
administration), it inevitably met opposition. This is not to say that those
policies were wrong, only that they were not supported by the mainstream at
that time. And support for policy is an important part of a successful
policy.
Any policy that attempts to influence a democratic transition in another
country will require close coordination between the President and Congress.
To expect Congress to give the administration a free hand in the conduct of
its foreign policy is an unreasonable assumption. Nor should it. Congress
played an important role in forcing the Reagan administration to clarify its
position and to better define its policies. In this way, tension between the
executive and legislative branches produced a moderate policy. Over time, it
forced an approach that assumed a middle path between Carter's human rights
policy and Reagan's realism. As Osgood has observed, "an idealistic policy
undiciplined by political realism is bound to be unstable and ineffective;
political realism unguided by moral purpose will be self-defeating and
futile." In one sense, a Republican administration and a Democratic Congress
were able to find this balance. In contrast, the control of both the
executive and legislative branches of government by the Democrats during the
Carter administration is perhaps one explanation of why Carter's policies were
not as balanced or as successful as one might have hoped.
. Robert E. Osgood, Ideals and Self-interest in America's
Foreign Relations (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1953), p. 451.
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As such, US foreign policy needs to be bipartisan. Its goals may be
lofty, but expectations should be modest. It is important to stress the areas
of agreement, and to limit the areas that can be most divisive, even if that
means reducing US involvement. Some tension is not only inevitable, but
necessary as well. It should not, however, reach a point at which one branch
no longer respects the rights of the other. Congress must be mindful of the
President's role in making foreign policy, but the President should also
expect Congress to judge the results. Again, this is not necessarily the
"correct" way to approach these matters. It merely appears to be the most
appropriate given the US system.
Given a bipartisan approach, the United States has many options at its
disposal. As it did in each of the case studies, it can encourage a
transition using a bilateral approach. In particular, agencies within the US
government can support institutions in a particular developing nation. As in
the past, it can also provide broader support through initiatives such as the
Caribbean Basin Initiative or the Enterprise for the Americas. Such efforts,
however, will probably continue to meet with limited success.
The following table may serve to highlight the results of this study.
The first column indicates the level of US involvement (LI), where H=High,
M=Medium, and L=Low. The second category estimates the impact of US
involvement in that country's civil war (CW), which serves as a standard by
which to measure the other areas. In this category, only El Salvador received
a value. Given the level of US involvement, the third category estimates the
impact that involvement can have on the liberalization process (L), the next
category estimates the impact on democratization (D), and the fifth category
estimates the impact that US involvement can have on the consolidation of
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democracy (C). The final category estimates the total impact that the United
States had on any given transition. It is an average of the values given for
L, D, and C:
Country LI CW L D C Total
Chile M NA 1 <1 <1
Brazil L NA 1 <1 <1
El Salvador H 3 2 1 NA 2
Key: 0=Little or no factor, l=Somewhat of a factor, 2=Minor factor, 3=Major
factor, 4=The primary factor, NA=Not applicable, and <=Less than.
While the precise level of impact may be impossible to discern, these
results still serve a useful function. They indicate that the United States
is likely to have the greatest impact in encouraging regime liberalization, as
opposed to democratization or the consolidation of democracy. Considerable
efforts should, therefore, be made in defending human rights and in promoting
civil liberties. Pressure is most appropriate during this phase, especially
in countries such as El Salvador, where the government has fewer options.
Unfortunately, the level of success is likely to be less than desired, so
policy must be patient. As both Chile and Brazil suggest, sanctions must be
applied in a judicious manner. Overt criticism of a regime's policies also
appears to be a useful instrument, but it, too, has its limits. Therefore,
most pressure should come from the diplomatic (behind the scenes) level. In
addition to the tactics mentioned above, rewards for positive steps taken by j
regime are also in order.
Once liberalization begins, it appears that internal forces are less in
need of international actors. Once they are given the basic freedoms of
expression, they can begin to organize and increase pressure on the regime
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from within. In these case studies, and especially as it relates to Chile and
Brazil, it was the internal actors that ultimately forced the regime on the
path towards democracy. In effect, the United States becomes a bystander,
waiting to see if those groups have the ability to become a viable option in
the democratization process. If they are not ready, there is little else the
United States can do. If they are successful, then the US can once again
begin to play a role, this time as a supporter of democratic consolidation.
As far as the United States is concerned, support for the consolidation
of democracy is largely an indirect role. As it should have done with Chile,
it can immediately provide moral support by accepting that country back into
the fold of democratic nations. As with Brazil, it can also use its influence
in the IMF and World Bank to encourage policies that favor economic growth,
although policy makers should remember that such policies can be very divisive
in the short term, and therefore carry considerable risk.
As far as overall US policy is concerned, the level of influence that the
United States has in another country appears to be relatively unimportant.
This is due primarily to the fact that internal forces ultimately determine
the nature of any transition, and many of those forces are relatively immune
to United States' influence. This is particularly true in countries with
which the US has a moderate level of influence, such as Chile, or relatively
little influence, such as Brazil. In both types of countries the United
States should use considerable restraint, because those countries tend to I
more options. In a country with which the US has considerable influence,
as El Salvador, it can be somewhat more aggressive as those countries tend '
be more dependent. But here again, it would be prudent to recall that the
effort is likely to be significantly greater than the degree to which it mi
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influence any democratic transition.
A graph of these results yields other information that may be of
interest. By comparing the United States' involvement (in both economic and
diplomatic terms) with its impact on the various transitions, one finds one
















Level of US Involvement
From this graph, three things are evident. First, the level of US
involvement in democratic transitions is likely to be limited. Since the data
used for this graph are too imprecise, it is impossible to tell when US
involvement would have increasingly important ramifications, although at some
point, greater US involvement will bring increasing (and eventually
decreasing) rates of return. However, as the case study on El Salvador shows,
that involvement may have to be so great that it is unlikely to occur given
the political environment in Washington. (It is quite possible that in terms
of aid, El Salvador has already reached the point of diminishing returns.
)
Such a point would mean a virtual occupation of that country, and that is
clearly not a viable option in the pursuit of a general theory to promote
democratic transitions in developing countries. Exceptions (such as Panama
and Grenada) may occur, but they are likely to be few and far between.
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The second implication of this graph is that the United States is
unlikely to have a significant impact on its own. As such, it would appear
that were the US to be serious about promoting democratic transitions in
developing countries, it would need to rely on greater resources. Therefore,
another approach the United States could use would be to combine efforts with
other countries and international agencies in order to maximize international
efforts towards influencing those transitions. In some important ways this
approach is now being followed. Changes in Soviet foreign policy have made a
more moderate approach by the US possible. With the "New World Order", the
Bush administration has demonstrated its ability and desire to work with other
nations when there is fundamental agreement on policy aims. Such agreement
may not be easy, but it is not impossible. In addition to the US, the nations
of Western Europe consider a nation's efforts to promote democracy and secure
basic human rights before dispensing aid, and there are indications that Japan
may do so as well (even if the motives are different). Institutions, such as
the UN, may also begin to play a greater role in international affairs, though
to be effective their role would have to be expanded. From this perspective,
the approach could be similar to the one suggested for the US, only on a much
greater scale. The continued coordination of these actors will be most
difficult, but such coordination would provide the best hope of influencing a
democratic transition.
Since the changes in the world's political environment are relatively
recent, it is difficult to determine the impact that well coordinated
international actors could have on democratic development. However, the
results of this study indicate that they are unlikely to be as great as one
might hope. More pressure may be able to be applied to a greater number of
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countries, but as in each of these case studies, the effort is likely to be
much greater than the impact. This does not mean that such influence attempts
are not worth the effort. On the contrary, they are in everyone's best
interest. It implies only that considerable patience is required. In short,
it is most probable that internal factors will continue to dominate democratic
transitions, with international factors playing only a secondary role.
The third and final point to be made from this graph is that the United
States appears to have some influence regardless of its involvement. It could
be, in effect, a residual influence that results from the mere fact that the
US is recognized as a great nation, which serves as an example for all
concerned. Thus, if policy makers wish to promote democracy abroad, serving
as a beacon is one way to do it. In conclusion, good foreign policy begins
with good government here at home.
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A PPEN D I X
I. Direct US Economic and Military Assistance to Chile (M US)
Year Economic Military Total Total Average 1
Assistance Assistance Econ/Mil S. America S. America
1974 4.0 15 .9 19.9 290.4 29.0
1975 73.3 .7 74.0 318.0 31.8
1976 81.5 - 81.5 304.2 30.4
1977 19.2 - 19.2 135.6 13.6
1978 6.9 - 6.9 196.1 19.6
1979 10.5 - 10.5 180.7 18.1
1980 10.2 - 10.2 141.7 14.2
1981 12.1 - 12.1 145.7 14.6
1982 6.7 - 6.7 133.0 13.3
1983 2.8 - 2.8 204.7 20.5
1984 1.7 - 1.7 328.2 32.8
1985 1.3 - 1.3 219.2 21.9
1986 1.1 - 1.1 235.7 23.6
1987 1.1 - 1.1 235.4 23.5
1988 - - - 190.0 19.0
1989 - - - 113.4 11.3
1990 - - - 136.9 13.7
II. Direct US Economic and Military Assistance to Brazil (M US|
1974 13.0 52.8 65.8 290.4 29.0
1975 13.5 60.9 75.4 318.0 31.8
1976 4.6 44.6 49.2 304.2 30.4
1977 3.8 .1 3.9 135.6 13.6
1978 2.0 - 2.0 196.1 19.6
1979 1.9 - 1.9 180.7 18.1
1980 2.4 - 2.4 141.7 14.2
1981 1.1 - 1.1 145.7 14.6
1982 .7 - .7 133.0 13.3
1983 .4 - .4 204.7 20.5
1984 - - - 328.2 32.8
1985 .8 - .8 219.2 21.9
1986 .7 - .7 235.7 23.6
1987 5.4 - 5.4 235.4 23.5
1988 - - - 190.0 19.0
1989 - .1 .1 113.4 11.3
1990 .1 .1 136.9 13.7
1 10 South American countries are included in the total
and the average: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia
Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
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Sources: US. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Foreign
Assistance Legislation for Fiscal Year(s) : 1981 (Part 1) , 96th Cong. , 2nd
sess., 1980, pp. 76-77, 126+ (1974-1979); 1982 (Part 7) , 97th Cong. , 1st
sess., 1981; 1983 (Part 6) , 97th Cong., 2nd sess., 1982; 1986-1987 (Part 6) ,
99th Cong., 1st sess., 1985; 1988-89 (Part 7) . 100th Cong., 1st sess., 1987
(1988); 1990-1991 (Part 7) , 101st Cong. , 1st sess. , 1989 (1989-1990). See
also, Wilkie, James W. , and Enrique Ochoa, eds. Statistical Abstract of Latin
America. Volume 27 . Los Angeles: UCLA Latin American Center Publications,
University of California, 1989, pp. 769-772 (1980-1987).
Six Central American countries are included in the total
and the average: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Nicaragua, and Panama.
. Nicaragua received no further aid after 1982. The
average figure for Central American aid was, thereafter, divided
among only five countries.
4
. Panama received no further aid after 1988. The average




















Source: Wilkie, James W. , and Enrique Ochoa, eds. Statistical Abstract of
Latin America (Vol. 24/Vol. 27) . Los Angeles: UCLA Latin American Center
Publications, University of California, 1985 (Vol. 24), p. 484; 1989 (Vol.
27), p. 604.
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The following periodicals proved most helpful from 1979-1990.
Business Week






US News & World Report
The following news services proved most helpful from 1979-1990.
Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)
Information Services on Latin America (ISLA)
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